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Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation (REDD+) is a 
global initiative aimed at curbing carbon emissions from forest cover change. 
Indonesia, one of the most biodiverse places on the planet with the third largest extent 
of tropical forest, has been extensively involved in REDD+. Despite commitments 
from the government of Indonesia and the international community, the deforestation 
rate has not stabilized or decreased in the years since REDD+'s introduction in 2007. 
As of 2012, it was arguably the highest in the world. While there is an extensive body 
of literature on REDD+, the need for grounded observations from the field could 
clarify existing challenges and inform future pursuits. 
This dissertation presents the results of over two years of ethnographic 
research in Indonesia on REDD+. Qualitative data collection techniques such as 
participant observation, site visits and interviews provide a rich tapestry of data that 
  
was analyzed in combination with scholarly literature and policy. The research finds 
that despite a number of changes to laws and regulations resulting from REDD+ 
implementation in Indonesia, weak institutional capacity and corruption have negated 
gains. The results of a case study of three REDD+ project sites identify important 
criteria at the root of success or failure: finance, community, boundary enforcement, 
monitoring, and outcomes of attempted carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
preservation. Challenges identified for each criteria include a lack of sufficient 
funding opportunities; inability to enforce boundaries due to corruption; and lack of a 
solid plan for involving communities. Carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
preservation results were mixed due to lack of monitoring and problems with 
encroachment. Finally the results of the qualitative data collection with stakeholders 
indicates a crisis of confidence among REDD+ stakeholders; cultural barriers to 
communication; a disconnect between international rhetoric and local reality; 
corruption and governance issues resulting in a lack of pathways for project 
implementation. I argue that changes must be made to Indonesian policy, monitoring 
technologies must be utilized, and stakeholders need to address some of the problems 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
 
In 2015, the world population reached 7.34 billion, and is predicted to reach 9.72 
billion by 2050 (United Nations 2015). Many scientists are now referring to the current 
age as the “Anthropocene” because of the far reaching and often devastating effects that 
humans are having on the natural world (Crutzen 2006; Smith and Zeder 2013; Steffen, 
Crutzen, and McNeill 2007). Climate change (IPCC 2014) and biodiversity loss 
(Cardinale et al. 2012; Diaz and Duffy 2006) are among the most concerning of these 
human-induced changes. Deforestation is a major contributor to annual anthropogenic 
carbon emissions (IPCC 2014) and a good deal of biodiversity loss is directly linked to 
deforestation (Allnutt et al. 2008; Brook, Sodhi, and Ng 2003; WWF Indonesia 2008). 
Carbon sequestration and other forest ecosystem services, such as erosion prevention and 
water filtration, are essential to the survival of the human species and cannot be 
replicated through technology or human ingenuity (Nasi, Wunder, and Campos 2016). 
Furthermore, 1.6 billion people, 25 percent of the world’s population, rely directly on 
forests for their livelihoods (UN FAO 2016).  In response to the role of deforestation in 
climate change and the importance of forests to humanity, the United Nations created a 
program called Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD+). REDD+ was designed to incorporate ecosystem services of forests, such as 
carbon sequestration, into the global economy by having developed countries pay 
developing countries to reduce carbon emissions from deforestation and forest 
degradation.  Later iterations of the program came to include other co-benefits besides 
carbon sequestration, including biodiversity preservation and strengthening community 




REDD+ is essentially a payment for ecosystem service scheme (Corbera 2012; Redford 
and Adams 2009) in which developed nations pay developing nations for some of the 
ecosystem services provided by forests. It is arguably one of the largest and most 
complicated environmental management plans of its kind, and offers hope and a potential 
solution for some of the concerns about high deforestation rates (Hansen et al. 2013) in 
many developing nations with tropical forests. The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate 
Change’s Fifth Annual report states that REDD+ has the potential to help mitigate 
climate change, conserve biodiversity and preserve many of the other ecosystem services 
provided by forests (IPCC 2015).  Despite the potential of REDD+, forest governance in 
many developing countries is very complicated (Transparency International 2011; Bolin 
et al. 2012) and the future of the program and its success remain uncertain (Mabele and 
Scheba 2016). 
1.1 Selection of Indonesia 
While REDD+ is being implemented in dozens of countries globally, Indonesia 
provides a crucial focal point for the possibility of REDD+ success or failure because of 
the extent of its forests, high deforestation rate (Hansen et al. 2013; Margono et al. 2014), 
and complexity of forest governance there (Enrici and Hubacek 2016). Moreover, along 
with the Amazon, it is arguably one of the places where REDD+ has gotten the most 
international financial support (Barrett and Goldstein 2016; Government of Norway and 
Government of Indonesia 2010) and attention. Over 40 REDD+ projects have been 
initiated, though some of these have already ended in failure. Even after the introduction 
of REDD+ Indonesia’s deforestation rate has remained high (Margono et al. 2014; (WRI 




implementation progresses there is a need for more research on the realities for the 
program regarding the Indonesian context, pathways for achieving successful outcomes, 
and challenges that are faced by those involved with REDD+ at all scales of 
implementation.  The aim of this research is to explore the complexities of and 
possibilities for REDD+ in Indonesia in regards to the literature, policy, governance, and 
stakeholder experiences.  
Indonesia has the third largest tropical forest in the world and one of the highest 
rates of deforestation globally (Hansen et al. 2013; Margono et al. 2014).  It was chosen 
as the location for this research because of its high rate of deforestation, the complicated 
and interesting example it provides as a REDD+ pilot country, and because of the need 
for more thorough understanding of how to make REDD+ work there. REDD+ efforts 
began there in 2008 and since then, over 40 REDD+ demonstration activities have been 
initiated, though not all of these are still running. REDD+ plus thus presents opportunities 
for Indonesia to benefit financially from forest reserves and prevent more negative 
environmental and social consequences from further large-scale deforestation.  
Despite the promise that REDD+ offers for Indonesia’s forests (Busch et al. 
2015), its implementation has been complicated as a result of the political climate in 
Indonesia (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; Galudra et al. 2011; Brockhaus et al. 2012), high 
demand for the resources within forested lands (Abood et al. 2014) , and the country’s 
history of questionable forest management practices (Transparency International 2011; 
HRW 2013). REDD+ projects in Indonesia, and elsewhere, have experienced various 
degrees of success and failure. Even though REDD+ in Indonesia began in 2007, many 




specific challenges and opportunities that exist for REDD+ is necessary to inform future 
policy and implementation efforts.  
1.2 Evaluative Framework 
This research was conducted using an applied geographical framework in order to 
be able to identify tangible solutions to the challenges of REDD+ implementation and 
forest management in Indonesia. An applied framework in geographical and 
anthropological research means using a problem-oriented approach in order to find 
practical solutions to social, economic, and environmental problems (Pacione 1999; 
Pacione 2004; Van Willigen 2002). In this study I approach the data with a problem-
oriented approach by identifying what the problems and challenges are for REDD+ 
implementation in Indonesia.  The applied framework was combined with a grounded 
theory approach and inductive coding to determine the important themes from the data 
collected (Corbin and Strauss 2007).  
1.3 Intellectual merit 
The intellectual merit of this project lies in its ability to contribute to knowledge 
about natural resource management and the complex systems within which those 
resources are situated. Ostrom (2009) proposes that research on complex social-
ecological systems is needed in order to facilitate sustainability efforts, and that particular 
attention must be focused on the relationships between various levels of these complex 
systems across multiple scales. This research does just that through a multi-sited 
ethnography with stakeholders from different scales who work with the complex social 
ecological system of REDD+ and tropical forests in Indonesia. Furthermore, this research 




fit, within a national framework, thus advancing understanding on the implications of 
REDD+ for stakeholders and the potential of REDD+ to successfully reduce emissions 
and provide co-benefits. Through an intensive qualitative investigation of the complex 
social ecological systems of forest management and REDD+ in Indonesia this research 
will contribute to knowledge on the topics of natural resource management and REDD+ 
in the Indonesian context and globally. 
1.4 Broader impacts 
This research will have broader impacts by adding to the existing knowledge base 
on REDD+ in Indonesia. The results can inform the ongoing development of REDD+ in 
Indonesia and the dozens of other countries currently implementing the program. This 
research is desperately needed in the case of Indonesia, where corruption (Butt 2011; 
Dermawan et al. 2011), weak governance (Djogo and Syaf 2004; HRW 2013) and a 
rapidly developing economy based on resource extraction (Butler, Koh, and Ghazoul 
2009; Carlson et al. 2013; Abood et al. 2014) have resulted in a complex and almost 
unnavigable system for conservation efforts. Furthermore, the research presented in this 
dissertation reveals that in Indonesia there is a major crisis of confidence among REDD+ 
stakeholders, and a disconnect between the international/national and local levels that 
may lead to problems in project implementation and a failure to address the root 
problems of weak forest management. As a result, research such as this is urgently 
needed to help identify pathways for successful implementation. The broader impact of 




1.5 Structure of the dissertation 
The aim of this dissertation is to give an in-depth and comprehensive 
understanding of REDD+ in Indonesia in order to identify challenges and opportunities 
for the program both at a country and global scale. This research is an exploration of how 
REDD+ is experienced by the people involved in the program and is based on the results 
of data collection that took place over a period of over two years in Indonesia. 
Ethnographic research such as this provides an opportunity to get unique, in-depth, 
descriptive information about phenomena such as REDD+ (Bernard 2000; Bernard 
2006). Literature and policy review were combined with qualitative data collection with 
REDD+ stakeholders operating at multiple scales.  Triangulation of data in this manner 
can also lead to increased validity (Decrop 1999) and for the purposes of this research 
offers an opportunity to gain insight into the context of international and national 
discourses, policy, and reality on the ground.  
Qualitative data collection was conducted with stakeholders of REDD+ in 
Indonesia, who for the purposes of this work are defined as someone who is, or has 
extensively been, directly involved in some aspect REDD+ program. Intensive fieldwork 
was conducted using qualitative ethnographic methods including visits to three major 
REDD+ project sites described in more detail in Chapter 3, participant observation, and 
semi-structured interviews. This data collection was complemented by a thorough and 
ongoing literature and policy review.  Results were recorded, transcribed, and coded 
using grounded theory and inductive coding methods.  Grounded theory and inductive 
methods use input from data collection in order build theory and results from the ground 




were reviewed at multiple stages of data collection in order to inform major themes and 
topics for conclusions and analysis. More details about methods can be found in sections 
2.3(p 16), 3.2.1(p 42) and 4.3 (p 91). 
The overarching research question driving this dissertation is: What lessons can 
be learned from how REDD+ has developed in Indonesia? This overarching question is 
explored through three more specific research objectives: 
Objective 1: Describe and assess the relevant policy and forest governance context in 
Indonesia, and how it has affected the implementation of REDD+ and the deforestation 
rate in Indonesia since the introduction of REDD+.   
Objective 2: Identify and describe the major factors that help REDD+ projects in 
Indonesia achieve goals for carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Assess 
these factors and the associated challenges for projects through the use of three case study 
project sites. 
Objective 3: Describe the experience of REDD+ stakeholders in Indonesia from a multi-
scale perspective to determine what the major challenges and opportunities are for the 
program.  
 This dissertation was written as three separate journal articles, intended for 
publication. The first of these has been published in a peer-reviewed publication and the 
second has been submitted for publication. As a result of this structure, there may be 
some repetition among the introduction, background, and methods sections of each 
chapter.  This chapter, Chapter 1, provides an introduction to the dissertation and Chapter 




objective 1 by assessing the governance factors and policy context for REDD+ and the 
deforestation rate since the program’s introduction.  It touches on some of the major 
challenges for REDD+ that are created by the Indonesian governance context. These 
include weak, complicated, and confusing governance; widespread corruption; and 
ineffective policies including the Presidential moratorium on new industrial forest 
licenses. Chapter 2 was structured using initial analysis of fieldwork and informed by 
review of REDD+ literature and relevant policy and was published in June of 2016 in the 
peer reviewed journal Energy, Ecology, and Environment.    
Chapter 3 focuses on Objective 2 and describes some major components of 
REDD+ projects that help to assess how carbon and biodiversity goals are achieved.  
Financial viability, community involvement, governing agency, and monitoring are 
described in detail in relation to the Indonesian context. Each of these factors are further 
explored through three case study sites from data collection in order to ascertain broader 
implications for REDD+ in Indonesia and elsewhere.  Chapter 3 is primarily based on the 
results of fieldwork, particularly three REDD+ project site visits. Comparison of these as 
case study sites and the challenges they have experienced provide a basis for 
understanding how REDD+ activities occur on the ground. This article is in preparation 
for submission to The Journal of Environment and Development. 
Chapter 4 presents the overall results of all of the interviews conducted for this 
research.  The results are an alarming but honest description of the crisis of confidence 
that is endemic to those working with REDD+ in Indonesia.  Other topics are also 
included, such as lack of pathways for implementation.  The results of this chapter are 




very few of those working on REDD+ believe it can work or succeed, how will it 
persevere in such a challenging context?  Chapter 4 uses some of the same data as chapter 
3, but takes more explicit results from all of the fieldwork interviews and more broadly 




Chapter 2: Business as usual in Indonesia: governance factors affecting 
the acceleration of the deforestation rate after the introduction of 
REDD+ 
2.1 Introduction  
 Between 2000 and 2012,, 2.3 million km2 of global forest cover was lost (Hansen 
et al., 2013).  Deforestation is the second largest source of anthropogenic carbon 
emissions (Van der Werf et al., 2009) and is a major contributor to climate change (IPCC 
2014).  Forests provide invaluable ecosystem services, are hotspots of biodiversity, and a 
direct source of livelihood for 65 million people in Indonesia alone (Barber et al., 2002). 
The most recent data for Indonesia shows that the 2013 percent of total tree cover loss 
outside of plantations was 47.13 percent (537,294ha), and in 2014 it was 62.31% 
(928,765ha) (WRI GFW 2016). As one of the most biodiverse places on the planet, and 
with a deforestation rate that has been accelerating in recent years (Margono et al. 2014), 
forest governance reform is urgently needed in Indonesia.  
However, due to the complex political, economic, and social systems that exist 
there implementation of policies and programs to improve forest management has proven 
to be highly challenging (Santosa et al. 2013). Indonesia is an emerging market with a 
growing economy. The activities that fuel this economic growth, such as palm oil 
plantations, mining, and timber extraction, are many of the same activities that result in 
deforestation and contribute to Indonesia’s carbon emissions. While much of Indonesia's 
forest cover has already been lost, much more is in danger of conversion -- approximately 
34.6 percent (~26.8 Mha) of the remaining forest cover is currently located within 




Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD) is a 
global initiative developed by the United Nations for protecting forests and reducing 
carbon emissions.. The initial concept behind REDD is to offer developing countries 
incentives to reduce activities that lead to deforestation, therefore maintaining the 
enormous amounts of carbon sequestered by forests (UN FAO 2012) while still 
maintaining economic growth (UN REDD Programme 2015). REDD+ also aims to 
include other important benefits beyond carbon sequestration, such as biodiversity 
preservation and community forest rights, which are increasingly being recognized as 
essential for successful forest management (Stevens et al. 2014). And while initially the 
plan for REDD+ offered much hope, the challenges associated with its implementation 
have raised many questions. The beginnings of REDD+ implementation have already 
lead to doubts about its potential to achieve what it is meant to and stakeholder fatigue in 
many instances. Of central concern is what effect REDD+, and related activities, will 
have on deforestation rates in both the immediate and long term future as policies created 
to support REDD+ may have unintended effects on the ground. This is one of the most 
central questions to REDD+, which this article begins to address by exploring how forest 
governance in Indonesia may have contributed to rising deforestation rates since the 
introduction of REDD+.  
 Regardless of the doubts and challenges there have arguably been some benefits 
resulting from REDD+ -- since its introduction in Indonesia in 2008 the discourse about 
improving forest governance has at least initially increased (Cronin & Santoso, 2010), 
demonstration activities have been implemented, and Indonesia's government has made 




the Government of Indonesia (GOI) and the international community, towards REDD+ 
and the reduction of deforestation related emissions (Government of Norway & 
Government of Indonesia, 2010) the deforestation rate in Indonesia has accelerated over 
the period from 2008 to 2012 (Hansen et al., 2013; Margono et al., 2014). The results of 
the Hansen (2013) publication have been controversial as they included commercial 
forestry dynamics, however the subsequent publication by Margono et al. 2014 addressed 
these concerns by excluding commercial forestry dynamics and clearly defining “primary 
forest” within the boundaries of that study. While the long-term impact of REDD+ 
remains to be seen, it is known that in the initial years after the introduction of REDD+ 
the deforestation rate in Indonesia continued to increase and identifying what is behind 
this increase can help to guide future efforts towards REDD+. 
2.2 Background: Deforestation and Forest Governance in Indonesia  
 Successful forest management in Indonesia faces many challenges, including 
corruption, overlapping authority and weak management practices (Center for Forestry 
Planning and Statistics & MoF 2009).  As they are used here the term government shall 
refer to the actual officials and agencies appointed to the Indonesian government, while 
governance shall refer to the overarching policy and outcomes that come as a result of the 
actions of the Indonesian government. Many of the governance issues can be traced back 
to the Suharto Regime, the period when Suharto was President of Indonesia lasting from 
1966 – 1998 and the subsequent decentralization.  Throughout this period there was a 
highly centralized governance system with strict, often violent, enforcement (Anderson, 
2001). Control of forests was often taken from indigenous forest communities and 




gained power, the tropical forests on Indonesia's outer islands remained largely intact, but 
after his presidency began in 1966 it is estimated that over 40 million hectares were lost  
(Barr, 2001). After the Suharto regime, rough data from 2001 to 2014 indicates that 
approximately 11.4% (~18.5MHa) of remaining forests were lost during that time(WRI 
GFW) 2016) And after the end of the Suharto regime, Indonesia’s government rapidly 
transitioned into a decentralized system and much of the authority over land use fell to 
regional authorities (McCarthy, 2004). The transition away from a strong central 
government led to a disconnect between the national government and regional 
governments, which allowed corruption to flourish at the district level and compounded 
the corrupt system already in place during the Suharto regime (Smith et al., 2003).  
Today, corruption is still a major problem for forest management in Indonesia 
(Dermawan et al., 2011; Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2013) and many residual land 
tenure issues from the Suharto regime remain (Neef et al., 2007). Furthermore, there is an 
overlap of national and regional authority in many regions, which combined with 
corruption and lack of institutional capacity leads to weak governance of forest areas 
(Brockhaus 2012).  Even successful management of conservation forests can be 
problematic despite the fact that these areas are officially designated as protected forests 
or National Parks (Yuliani et al. 2010). These issues combined with Indonesia's rapidly 
expanding economy manifest in creating a pathway for high deforestation rates.   
 While an expanding population, growing economy, and weak governance are the 
indirect drivers of deforestation in Indonesia, expanding industries are the direct causes 
of deforestation – namely, palm oil, mining and timber (Kissinger  et al. 2012).  Forest 




cause of deforestation in Indonesia (Tacconi, 2003). Over 100,000 fires were recorded for 
the year 2015 and resulted in Indonesia emitting more carbon from fires alone than the 
entire United States economy (Harris et al. 2015a)  and moving Indonesia from the 
world’s sixth largest emitter of carbon to the fourth in just 6 weeks (Harris et al. 2015b). 
While these fires were made worse by conditions caused by an  El Nino Southern 
Oscillation event, there are policies and aspects of governance which hamper the 
response to such fires (Tacconi 2003). Furthermore, they are sometimes intentionally and 
illegally set and precede the use of land for other interests such as logging or agriculture 
(Applegate et al. 2001; Fitzherbert et al. 2008). Once a forest has been degraded by fire, 
or other uses, it is no longer considered primary forest and more easily approved for 
conversion to palm oil or mining.  
Palm oil is an integral part of Indonesia's expanding economy and the 
government’s support of palm oil interests has the potential to conflict with other goals 
set for the reduction of deforestation (McFarland et al., 2015; Simamora, 2011). In the 
period from 1990 to 2010, the palm oil area in Indonesia increased by over 600 percent to 
a total of about 7.8 million hectares and during this time over 90 percent of deforestation 
from palm oil occurred in Sumatra and Kalimantan (Hansen et al. 2009), regions known 
for their high levels of biodiversity (Barber et al., 2002).  From 2000 to 2010 palm oil on 
Kalimantan alone expanded by 278 percent, and 90 percent of palm oil expansion on the 
island from 1990 to 2010 occurred on forested land (Carlson et al. 2013). Sumatra and 
Kalimantan are also the two islands of Indonesia with the highest rates of forest loss, 
Sumatra lost 17.6 percent and Kalimantan lost 7.9 percent of their overall forest cover 




and global demand and high prices for timber have encouraged the government to 
formulate policies allowing for intensive timber harvesting (Kissinger et al. 2012).  Much 
of the mining in Indonesia occurs in heavily forested regions and these operations are 
frequently established illegally in conservation areas or protection forest (Contreras-
Hermosilla et al. 2005; Indrarto et al., 2012). While much of Indonesia's forest cover has 
been lost to these drivers of deforestation, much more is in danger of conversion – as of 
2010, in Kalimantan alone, approximately 79 percent of the palm oil licenses covering 90 
percent of the remaining forest on the island have not yet been activated (Carlson et al., 
2013). 
 The recent acceleration of deforestation rates in Indonesia has happened in spite 
of a number of activities and commitments by the Government of Indonesia towards 
reducing deforestation. In 2009 the President of Indonesia, Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, 
pledged to reduce emissions by 26 percent without help from other countries, and 41 
percent with outside help, by the year 2020.  On May 26, 2010, Indonesia’s Government 
signed a Letter of Intent with the Government of Norway to implement REDD+ and meet 
certain deforestation reduction goals, with the promise of $1 billion USD for the 
successful achievement of those goals. This agreement stated that Indonesia would 
develop a national REDD+ strategy; establish a REDD+ agency, and institute a 
moratorium on the sale of licenses for natural forest and peatland. And following the 
Letter of Intent in May 2011, President Yudhoyono declared the moratorium officially 
(Pres. Instruction 10/2011; Pres. Instruction 6/2013).  In addition there has been increased 
discourse about, and reforms to, forest governance – increased recognition of customary 




(Djajono & Siswanty, 2011); and efforts towards increased attention to transparency 
through the One Map program, which aims to  create one source of information for all 
land use and land use licensing for all of Indonesia, something that does not currently 
exist (UKP4 2012). And in 2015 the new President, Joko Widodo, made an agreement 
with the Prime Minister of Norway to continue the efforts set forth by the initial letter of 
intent (Parlina, 2015). The following sections address some of the reasons why the 
deforestation rate in Indonesia has continued to accelerate during the initial period of 
REDD+’s introduction (Hansen et al., 2013; Margono et al., 2014) despite these actions.  
2.3 Methods 
 This paper aims to identify a number of factors that contribute to the complexity 
of the overall forest management situation in Indonesia, and which may hinder efforts 
towards reducing the deforestation rate as brought forth by stakeholders of REDD+ and 
supported by the relevant literature. The basis and foundation for this paper are derived 
from over 18 months of fieldwork in Indonesia working with stakeholders of REDD+. 
The fieldwork included participant observation at dozens of meetings and 68 interviews 
at various scales of governance – international, national, provincial, district and local.  
Interviews were semi-structured, and were recorded and later transcribed by the lead 
author.  Informants were chosen based on their involvement in REDD+ from various 
sectors including: government, civil service, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
multilateral development banks, research, private entities, and forest communities. The 
aspects of governance discussed here were repeatedly mentioned during the fieldwork in 
meetings or interviews, and thus emerged as major aspects of governance that contributed 




inputs are then further built upon with literature that exemplifies how these issues 
correlate with challenges to reducing deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia 
since the introduction of REDD+. The next section will focus on several aspects of the 
complicated and sometimes confusing regulations surrounding forest governance, 
including the official forest use classification system. 
2.4 Forest Classifications in Indonesia and defining “forests” 
 The legal designation of land as official forest (Kawasan Hutan) in Indonesia is 
not necessarily dependent on whether or not that area has actual forest cover or not, 
resulting in a dichotomy of forested areas that can be either institutionally recognized or 
non-institutionally recognized, as well as non-forested areas that are institutionally 
recognized as official forest. ‘Official forest’ (Kawasan Hutan) refers to land that has 
been officially designated by the Government of Indonesia as an area under the authority 
of the Ministry of Forestry (MoF). Within official forest areas there are further legal 
classifications of forest based on what that area may be used for – ranging from 
conservation to production forests for logging and agriculture. Indonesian Forestry Law 
(article 6 UU-41, 1999) dictates that official forest be categorized according to intended 
function, with three major categories: protection forest (hutan lindung), conservation 
forest (hutan konservasi) and production forest (hutan produksi). Production forest is then 
separated into three further categories: regular production forest (hutan produksi tetap), 
convertible production forest (hutan produksi konversi), and limited production forest 
(hutan produksi terbatas). Land that is outside the jurisdiction of the MoF is considered 
land for other uses (APL), and regardless of whether or not it actually has forest cover, it 




classification system is part of a complex and sometimes confusing system of laws and 
regulations for forest governance, which contributes to weak institutional capacity and 
increases opportunities for corruption that lead to mismanagement of resources 
(Contreras-Hermosilla et al., 2005; Dermawan et al., 2011; Transparency International, 
2011). 
Table 1 -- Legal forest designation, use and area extent as of 2013 
 
Table 1. Kawasan Hutan, official forest, is institutionally recognized forest in Indonesia. This is further 
broken down into subcategories of Sanctuary Reserve Area & Nature Conservation Area (KSA/KPA), 
Protection Forest (HL), Permanent Production Forest (HP), Limited Production Forest (HPT), and 
Convertible Production Forest (HPK). Also included here is Non-forest land (APL), and non-institutionally 
recognized forest, which can be found on some non-forest land (APL). Data from (Indonesia Ministry of 




2.4.1 Non-institutionally recognized forest 
 Indonesia has a significant amount of non-institutionally recognized forests and 
which are very vulnerable to deforestation. Also problematic, and as is discussed further 
below, some institutionally recognized forests have been converted to non- institutionally 
recognized forests since the introduction of REDD+.  While the designation of an area as 
institutionally recognized official forest has the potential to offer some degree of 
protection from deforestation and degradation, even conservation and protection forest is 
still vulnerable to deforestation (Curran et al., 2004). However, non-institutionally 
recognized forest, or land with forest cover that is designated as land for other use (APL), 
is even more susceptible to deforestation and degradation as demonstrated by the high 
rates of deforestation documented in many of these areas (Margono et al., 2012). Non-
institutionally recognized forest areas are more vulnerable to conversion because their 
designation as such means they are intended for other uses and this makes it easier to 
obtain land-use licenses for those areas. In recent years, an estimated one third of carbon 
emissions from Indonesia came from deforestation in areas that were legally designated 
as land for other uses (APL) with forest cover (non-institutionally recognized forests) 
(Gregersen et al. 2011).  A study of deforestation in Sumatra demonstrated that 
deforestation in official forest land from 1990 to 2010 ranged from 24 percent to 29 
percent, but primary forest that was designated as non-institutionally recognized forests 
(APL) experienced a 96 percent loss in forest cover (Margono et al., 2012). 
This indicates that much of Indonesia’s remaining forests are in a vulnerable 
position -- as of 2013 figures from the MoF indicate that approximately 8.17 million 




“APL”– or in other words, non-institutionally recognized forest (Indonesia Ministry of 
Forestry, 2014b). Also problematic is the fact that as a result of some of the recent forest 
related initiatives -- there have been reports from our fieldwork and other cases in the 
literature of official forest being converted to non-official forest (APL) (Barr et al., 2006; 
Indrarto et al., 2012), and which has likely contributed to the increase in the deforestation 
rate since the introduction of REDD+ in Indonesia.  
The existence of non-institutionally recognized forest also complicates 
transparency, accountability, and reporting of figures for forest cover loss. These 
differences between legal designation and actual land cover is one of the reasons that 
MoF data on deforestation rates in Indonesia have differed from those reported by other 
sources; in 2013 the MoF reported approximately 124 million ha of official forest 
(Indonesia Ministry of Forestry, 2014b) but satellite data showed approximately 92.4 
million ha of forest cover (Margono et al. 2014). Examples of conflicting data for forest 
cover and forest cover loss have also been seen among international reporting agencies 
(Indrarto et al. 2012) but also within the GoI data, among Indonesian governance 
institutions. For example in 2012, the Ministry of Environment (MoE) identified 59.8 
million ha of forest cover in Papua and the MoF identified 44.2 million ha (Samadhi, 
2013). Other significant reasons for the discrepancies between calculations for forest 
cover can include the use of different satellite data and also varying definitions of what 
constitutes a “forest” (Margono et al., 2014).  
 Definitions of forest can vary greatly, in their 2010 forestry statistics publication 




decided by the government as a permanent forest.”(Purnomo 2012, p 76). The FAO 
defines forest as, “Land spanning more than 0.5 hectares with trees higher than 5 meters 
and a canopy cover of more than 10 percent, or trees able to reach these thresholds in 
situ. It does not include land that is predominantly under agricultural or urban land 
use.”(FAO, 2006). The FAO defines primary forest as, “Naturally regenerated forest of 
native species, where there are no clearly visible indications of human activities and the 
ecological processes are not significantly disturbed.” ((UN FAO) Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations, 2015).  Despite discrepancies that may arise from 
varying definitions and legal forest designation, an analysis of primary forest defined by 
Margono et al. as “mature natural forests of 5 ha or more in extent that retain their natural 
composition and structure, and have not been completely cleared and re-planted in recent 
history, including both intact and degraded types” demonstrated that the rate of 
deforestation and forest degradation in Indonesia from 2000 to 2012 was increasing, with 
2012 demonstrating the highest rate of forest cover loss (Margono et al. 2014, p1).  
2.4.2 Forest Management Units 
 Further complicating the forest classification system in Indonesia, the 1999 
forestry law (Law No. 41/1999) states that all forest areas must be broken down into 
Forest Management Units (FMU), however, up until now this has not been completed. 
The National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) and the Strategic Plan of the 
Ministry of Forestry for 2010-2014 again revitalized the idea of FMUs by stating that 
FMUs must be designated for all official forest in Indonesia. These FMUs in Indonesia 
would be considered a separate legal designation from that of the official forest, but 




convertible production forest (HPK), protection forest  (HL), etc.) (Djajono & Siswanty 
2011). The intended purpose behind creating these FMUs is to increase the connection 
between National- and district-level forest governance, increase public access to forest 
resources and resolve conflict (Djajono & Siswanty 2011). They are described as, 
“…decentralized structures for forest management and planning at the site level, adapted 
to local conditions but linked into the National enforcing forest regulations such as forest 
fire control and other illegal practices, and negotiating with local communities on issues 
such as land use rights and forest access” (Government of Indonesia 2012).  These FMUs 
are intended as a means to extend national level control to the forest directly -- previously 
these areas were supposed to be managed by the MoF in Jakarta, but until recently there 
has been a lack of FMU designation. In cases where FMUs were established, authority 
over them often remained with district governments, which can be problematic because 
district interests may conflict with national interests. And furthermore, in many cases the 
district governments have been unable to enforce current regulations (Yuliani et al., 
2010). With the renewed plan for FMUs the MoF is in effect sending representatives to 
manage these areas locally, in collaboration with the district agencies, but still under the 
auspices of MoF oversight. While this has the potential to improve forest governance it 
could also allow for further challenges. 
 Until recently the MoF has legally had control over all institutionally recognized 
forest as long as it was designated official forest and regardless of whether or not it had 
been designated as an FMU. But in February of 2012 a court ruling, MK45, altered the 
original definition of official forest, so that it now states that official forest must also be 




ultimately under the authority of the MoF.  From 2009 to 2013 there has been progress in 
designation of FMUs, but the task is still far from complete (Indonesia Ministry of 
Forestry 2014b). As of 2012, only 14.2 million hectares, approximately 10.9 percent of 
Indonesia's official forest, have been formally gazetted into FMUs. This means that of the 
130.7 million hectares of official forest in Indonesia that was not previously gazetted, a 
total of 116.5 million hectares, approximately 89.1 percent, are potentially no longer 
under the authority of the MoF (Philip Wells et al., 2012).  
The MK45 court ruling has the potential to weaken the authority of the MoF and 
further complicate successful forest management in Indonesia, although it may or may 
not affect these dynamics in reality. More recent regulations, such as UU/23/2014, which 
is discussed further in section 3.1, add to these complications by reallocating authority 
back to the central government. So, while FMU designation has the potential to improve 
forest governance by decreasing the disconnect between different scales of governance, it 
could also allow for further challenges – for example, in certain areas the gazetting of an 
FMU has caused the borders of the National Park to be reduced, increasing the 
vulnerability of the area no longer included in the national park to conversion (Yuliani et 
al., 2010). Regardless, such ambiguities and complexities contribute to an already 
challenging forest governance situation. Even if FMUs are established, many of these 
areas must also be assessed for tenure; specifically who has possession of current licenses 
for land use. 
2.4.3 Forest classification and Tenure 
 Tenure problems plague forest management and land use in Indonesia. In our 




licenses on community forest, smallholder palm oil encroachment onto REDD+ projects, 
and artisanal mining in National Parks. Much of Indonesia's official forest has contested 
tenure -- licenses are often issued that contradict the official forest use categories 
(Indrarto et al., 2012). Problems with tenure play into the aspects of governance 
discussed here and will be included throughout the discussion as relevant, though tenure 
issues in Indonesia are comprehensively discussed in many other articles -- (Contreras-
Hermosilla et al., 2005; Larson et al., 2013; USAID, 2010).  One of the main tenure 
challenges relevant to this discussion are discrepancies for who has authority over land 
among different levels of governance – from the National, to the Province, to the District 
-- and as a result, licenses are sometimes issued that contradict the MoF official forest use 
designation ( Barr et al., 2006).  Overlapping tenure and licensing can also be found 
among forest communities, government, and private interests –seen in instances of 
existing unactivated palm oil and mining concession licenses that overlap with 
community forests and conservation areas. This kind of overlapping tenure can occur 
among various interests: between communities and the government; between 
communities and private companies; between companies and the government; among 
state institutions; among companies; among communities; and any combination of these 
as well (Steni & Hadad, 2012). These tenure conflicts in Indonesia were observed in our 
fieldwork, are well documented in the literature and occur for different reasons such as 
corruption and exceptions made to forest protection laws but especially because of the 
overlap overlapping authority among various scales of forest governance (Barr et al., 
2010; Eilenberg, 2012; Smith et al., 2003). There are many documented cases in which 




some instances these licenses exist in protection or conservation forest – for example, as 
of 2011 there were at least 13 mining companies operating in protection forest covering 
850,000 hectares (Indrarto et al., 2012).  
Overlapping tenure is particularly problematic when taking into consideration 
community forest rights in Indonesia. Such rights in Indonesia are institutionally 
challenged with less than 1 percent of Indonesia's forest governmentally recognized as 
community forest (Stevens et al., 2014).  In many areas of the country, forest 
communities have been living on and using official forest for generations, but that land is 
generally considered to be owned by the state and in many cases, already licensed out to 
private interests such as palm oil, timber, or mining companies. For example, 
approximately 59 percent of community forest in West Kalimantan is covered by palm 
oil concessions not yet activated (Stevens et al., 2014). Examples of this from our 
fieldwork included maps demonstrating palm oil concessions existing on top of hutan 
adat (community forest) that had been known to belong to the community for 
generations.   
A court ruling, ‘Indonesian Constitutional Court decision no.35/PIU/2012’ 
(known as MK35) was meant to reform complications with this aspect of forest tenure, 
stating that hutan adat is no longer state land, or in other words is not under the authority 
of the MoF and separate from official forest (UNORCID 2013).While MK35 is a step in 
towards securing community forest tenure, there are still complications to actually 
establishing indigenous tenure in many cases and it is possible that it will take many 
years to accomplish such an effort. Yet to date there are very few areas that have been 




government authorities, have acknowledged that the pathway to do so will likely be time 
consuming and difficult. In order for such a designation to be made, the government must 
first recognize local communities as an “indigenous” group, and then their right to the 
forest must also be established. Considering the already complicated land tenure system, 
the overlap between national and district authorities regarding forested lands, and the 
high economic value of forest area this will be difficult to establish in many cases.  
2.5. Weak governance  
Although some reforms have been made in recent years, weak forest governance 
is ubiquitous in Indonesia manifesting as confusing regulations, weak institutional 
capacity, corruption, overlapping authority, and insufficient sanctions for violations. 
These issues originate from a history of problematic governance since the period of 
Dutch colonization, the Suharto Regime, and the subsequent decentralized governance 
system (Suwarno et al. 2015) as discussed above. Because of these challenges forest loss 
in Indonesia is occurring not just in designated production forests, but also in areas that 
are institutionally recognized, and protected (Margono et al., 2014). Between 2000 and 
2012, 40 percent of all primary forest loss in Indonesia occurred within areas that prohibit 
clearing (Margono et al., 2014) and a low estimate by the MoF from 2007 quantified 
approximately 200,000 hectares of encroachment per year happening in conservation 
areas (Murdiyarso, Dewi, Lawrence, & Seymour, 2011).  In 2013, MoF statistics report 
that approximately 13 percent of deforestation was in conservation and protection forest 




2.5.1 Overlapping authority 
Laws are confusing and make identification of violations difficult because the 
wording of laws and regulations sometimes conflict among each other, and potentially 
within themselves (Indrarto et al., 2012). Even when there is a clear case of a violation 
often there are no sanctions in place to punish violators and furthermore authorities often 
lack the capacity to enforce what sanctions do exist (Faure & Wibisana, 2013). Confusing 
regulations can also exacerbate weak governance when there is ambiguity concerning the 
authority of national and regional governance, and which further leads to conflicts 
between national goals for forest management and land use and what is happening in 
reality (Barr et al., 2006). District governments in the Indonesian system wield a fair 
amount of authority over decisions for land use in their districts, and sometimes their 
actions may conflict with or override the stated intentions of the National government. 
This is exemplified when the National government may designate a forest area as 
protected, but later regional authorities can, and do, issue licenses for operating within 
those areas and then leads to clearing or degradation in protected areas (Contreras-
Hermosilla et al., 2005). There have been examples of this happening from both our 
fieldwork and in the literature (Barr et al., 2006).  
While there have been steps taken towards reforming some of these complicated 
governance dynamics, change happens slowly and is not immediately seen on the ground. 
One example of this is in 2014, “Law Number 23 about Local Government”, 
UU/23/2014, was passed and was meant to reallocate authority over land use from district 
governments to provincial and ultimately the central government. If implemented, this 




permits that conflict with the central government’s intentions could no longer be issued 
by the district. Additionally, it could strengthen the authority of the central government as 
there will be far fewer provincial governments to control (around 34) while there are over 
500 district governments.  However, the law has yet to take effect on the ground, and to 
date district governments have retained authority over forest land use.      
Furthermore, corruption in the forestry sector can be connected to the overlap in 
authority at different scales of governance. Protected areas may be designated at the 
national level, but enforcement of protected areas falls to local authorities. These 
authorities may expect to receive incentives in order to stop encroachment and may be 
used to receiving bribes from other land use interests. Historically, and today, it is not 
uncommon for companies or individuals wanting to operate within a particular area to 
give a payment as a bribe or tribute to local authorities (Transparency International, 2011; 
Wadley & Eilenberg, 2005), and while this may still be customary it is no longer 
considered legal. As a result, successful enforcement of forest area boundaries is 
problematic even when an area is designated as a conservation area (HL/KSA/KPA), 
REDD+ activity, or National Park. In the case of national parks or activities such as 
REDD+ projects, when there is not likely to be anyone willing or able to make such 
payment those areas are left vulnerable to encroachment.   
Conservation areas and REDD+ projects face encroachment from both small and 
large scale palm oil, logging, and mining, to which authorities, without sufficient 
incentives and/or capacity to enforce, turn a blind eye. Examples of this kind of 




borders a protected area (WWF 2013; Yuliani et al., 2010) and has also been reported by 
those running REDD+ activities. Throughout our fieldwork there were a number of 
observed and reported incidents of encroachment occurring on protected areas and on 
REDD+ projects, with virtually no action from local authorities. Encroachment can be 
small in scale to begin with, perpetuated by corporations, individuals or small groups, but 
when not halted by authorities, paid to look the other way, it can spread to cover 
thousands of hectares, as has happened in a number of National Parks and REDD+ 
projects already (Hoffman, 2014; WWF 2013; Yuliani et al., 2010).  
2.5.2 Corruption 
It is widely acknowledged that corruption is a problem in Indonesia, particularly 
in relation to the forestry sector (Dermawan et al., 2011) and which is further 
compounded by confusing regulations and the legacy of complicated land tenure issues 
from the Suharto regime (Neef et al., 2007). The pervasiveness of corruption in Indonesia 
can be seen when looking at the mining sector, one of the main contributors to 
deforestation – only 40 percent of over 10,000 registered mining companies were found 
to have clean and clear business permits (Cahyat, 2014). Revenues associated with forest 
resources and official forest use related projects has made it a particularly attractive 
sector for corruption -- it is estimated that between 2007 and 2011, seven billion USD 
were lost to corruption within the forestry sector and illegal logging activities in 
Indonesia (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2013).  
There are different types of corruption happening at different levels of forest 




institutionally protected areas (Smith et al., 2003). And because corruption in Indonesia 
reaches into the top levels of regional and central government, and across ministries, its 
eradication is difficult. Transparency and accountability are key to preventing corruption, 
but have not been integral parts of Indonesian forest governance (Dermawan et al., 2011). 
While the introduction of REDD+ has brought about opportunities for governance reform 
and increased accountability, it has done the same for increased corruption. The 
Government of Indonesia has acknowledged the risk of increased corruption activities 
related to REDD+ and some steps have been taken towards reform over the past decade. 
These include the work of a corruption eradication agency, which has brought a number 
of anti-corruption cases to court in recent years. The Corruption Eradication Commission 
(Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi; KPK) was founded in 2002 and also has a special 
governmental unit dedicated exclusively to natural resource management and 
governance.  
According to an assessment done by the KPK, the MoF was found to be the 
lowest ranked government ministry in Indonesia on an integrity survey and furthermore 
responsible for inaccurately mapping forest cover, land use, concessions and unfairly 
allocating land rights (Human Rights Watch (HRW), 2013).  The KPK has had a number 
of successes, many related to forest governance reform, and for some time has been 
considered to be an effective and well respected agency (Schuette, 2012; Stevens et al., 
2014).  The KPK has also been described as weak for not prosecuting high ranking 
individuals, and when it has brought charges against such individuals, members of the 
KPK faced serious pushback in the form of allegations from other agencies (Vernaz, 




forces at odds with the goals of the KPK (Butt, 2011; Dermawan et al., 2011). A revision 
to the original KPK law was proposed in 2016, which would significantly cut back on the 
power that the KPK has in investigating corruption. However, while the revision was 
being discussed, public protests caused the revision to be shelved (Amindoni, 2016).  
2.5.2 Lack of Sanctions 
Further characterizing weak governance in Indonesia’s forestry sector is the issue 
of a lack of sanctions for violators. The legal sanctions for violations of forest regulations 
are non-existent or too weak to support enforcement (Contreras-Hermosilla et al., 2005; 
Faure & Wibisana, 2013; Indrarto et al., 2012). For example, even in some instances 
when there are clear and identified violations by license holders, licenses have been 
initially retracted but then later reissued (Indrarto et al., 2012). Adding to the fact that 
sanctions are scarce, they are also difficult to impose -- there is often ambiguity about 
who may enforce them. This is evidenced by the fact that the Minister of Forestry is 
responsible for official forest land but does not have the authority to impose sanctions if 
there are permits issued on the official forest by another sector (Indrarto et al., 2012). 
Extensive encroachment, as described above happens because of corruption, but also 
weak institutional capacity resulting in part from a lack of sanctions. Another example of 
the need for stronger sanctions can be seen in the case of the Presidential Moratorium on 
new licenses on primary forest. As recently as 2011, there were no sanctions developed in 
accordance with the Moratorium on new licenses in primary forest and within the first 
three months after the moratorium was issued, over 100 incidents of deforestation were 




2.6 The Moratorium 
The Presidential Moratorium on new concessions for primary forest was 
announced as a follow up to Indonesia’s public commitment to REDD+ and Letter of 
Intent with Norway. Although welcomed by some stakeholders as significant progress in 
the effort to reduce deforestation rates in Indonesia, many other stakeholder groups were 
concerned that aspects of the moratorium and its execution could be problematic 
(ICSCFPGC 2012; Murdiyarso et al., 2011) particularly the fact that it fails to offer new 
protection to areas not already protected before its creation.  While in some ways the 
moratorium represents the effort and willingness that the GoI has demonstrated in recent 
years to curb emissions and reform forest governance, it also reflects the complications 
that characterize the situation in Indonesia. Moreover, the moratorium itself may have 
been at least partial motivation for the conversion of official forest land to non-
institutionally recognized forest.  
As discussed in section 2.0, Forest Classification and Defining Forests above, 
non-institutionally recognized forest is more vulnerable to conversion than institutionally 
recognized forests. And after the Moratorium was announced, there have been a number 
of instances of official forest being converted to non-institutionally recognized forest 
(APL). Examples of this can be found at both the national and subnational levels. In one 
instance, 11 days after the moratorium started, a Ministerial Decree ordered 1.2 million 
hectares of official forest in the REDD+ pilot province of Central Kalimantan to be 
converted to non-institutionally recognized forest (APL) (Murdiyarso et al. 2011). 
Another example identified through interviews and fieldwork is in Kapuas Hulu, 




Nasional Betung Kerihun and Taman Nasional Danau Santarum. In 2013, approximately 
5 percent of official forest, institutionally recognized forest estate, in Kapuas Hulu was 
converted to non-institutionally recognized official forest, or land for other use (APL).  
There have been other criticisms regarding the moratorium -- one component of 
this is that when all things are considered the moratorium does not afford protection to as 
much area as it originally seemed to protect, when taking into account the exceptions to 
the moratorium and already previously protected forest concessions, only ~26 percent, or 
11.3 million hectares of the 66.4 million hectares of forest cover included the moratorium 
map are actually given protection by the moratorium (Austin et al. 2012; Murdiyarso et 
al. 2011).  Ultimately at least 29 percent of the country's peatlands and 21 percent of 
Indonesia's remaining primary forests are not included in the associated moratorium map 
and all of this primary forest is designated as either production, limited production, or 
convertible forests (Murdiyarso et al., 2011). Looking at the entire area covered by the 
moratorium, 63.8 percent (42.4 million ha) had already been designated as conservation 
or protection forest area, and another 19 percent (12.7mha) of which is otherwise 
geographically or legally protected (Austin et al., 2012).   
Other concerns include confusion over terminology used in the presidential 
instructions, exclusion of some areas of primary forest & peatland, and the practicalities 
of enforcement. The exclusions refer to the fact that the presidential instructions 
contained a number of exceptions to the area to be included in the moratorium. One 
exception is regarding licenses that have “received approval in principle from [the] 




peatland (INPRES 6/2013, p. 2). This has important implications for the scope of the 
moratorium, as can be seen from differences between the first release of the moratorium 
map (not excluding these areas) and the second release of the map (which excludes these 
areas).  In the first version of the map, these licenses were not excluded but in the 
November 2011 updated version, they were removed and resulted in net change of 
approximately 3.6 million hectares of primary forest and peatland being excluded from 
the moratorium area, or 7.6 percent of the original area from the moratorium (Austin et 
al., 2012; Wells, Franklin, & Paoli, 2011). And, over 4 million hectares, or 25 percent of 
the moratorium area initially afforded new protection, was later excluded from the 
moratorium primarily because of pre-existing palm oil concessions (Wells & Paoli, 
2011).  
 The second and third exceptions have also proven problematic in their ability to 
protect primary forest cover.  The second exception is for, “implementation of national 
development that is vital, namely: geothermal, oil and gas, electricity, land for rice and 
sugar cane;” (INPRES 6/2013, p. 2).  The mention of electricity in this exception could 
include coal mining, one of the major drivers of deforestation in Indonesia (Indrarto et al. 
2012), responsible for a low estimate of approximately 10 percent of deforestation in 
Indonesia as of 2005 (Contreras-Hermosilla et al., 2005). After the release of the 
presidential instructions (INPRES 10/2011), a ministerial decree with specific details for 
implementation was issued to a number of national level ministries, agencies, and 
subnational government officials.  The ministries and agencies to which this was released 
notably excluded the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Energy and Mineral 




mining (INPRES 10/2011; INPRES 06/2013; Murdiyarso et al. 2011).  The third 
exception pertains to rights of businesses currently holding licenses to maintain those 
licenses, regardless of whether they are on high conservation value (HCV) forest at the 
moment or not. This exception states, “Extension of existing permits for forest 
exploitation and/or forestry area utilization as long as the business license remains valid.” 
(INPRES 6/2013,p 2).  
The fourth exception has more positive implications as it allows for the granting 
of Ecosystem Restoration Concessions (ERC). ERCs are essential to REDD+ 
implementation in Indonesia, as it allows REDD+ projects to be implemented in 
production official forest (HP) in Indonesia. This means that forest that is otherwise 
designated as available for logging, mining, or agricultural concessions can instead 
potentially be turned into REDD+ projects.  
 The wording and content of the moratorium itself has also been controversial and 
in some instances confusing. For example there is conflict between the text of the 
moratorium and two earlier editions of the moratorium map (Wells & Paoli, 2011).  
Furthermore, while the moratorium's rather broad definition of peatland can be seen to 
have an advantage, in that it is broad enough that it includes all areas of peatland greater 
than 50cm in depth that have not already been concessioned (Wells & Paoli, 2011) this is 
not the case with the way that forest is defined. While the definition of peatland is broad 
and inclusive, in contrast the loose terms used to define forest left much of the 




Controversial is the use of the term “primary forest” as the terminology in the 
Letter of Intent with Norway was for “natural forest”, but that used in the moratorium is 
“primary natural forest and peatland”.  As discussed above, definitions of forest vary, but 
when terms are not explicitly defined in official policy documents it can be problematic 
for enforcement. In the case of the moratorium, it was the first time that the term 
“primary natural forest” has been used in Indonesian forest policy. At the time of this 
publication there was still no agreed upon definition in Indonesian policy for 'primary 
natural forest', those that exist conflict with one another (Murdiyarso et al., 2011). 
Another problem with the term primary forest is that it could potentially exclude 
approximately half of Indonesia's forest cover, as it has also been reported by the MoF 
that primary forest is considered to be forest area that has not been logged ( Wells & 
Paoli, 2011).  Much of Indonesia's official forest is considered secondary forest, or 
disturbed forests, areas that are often still rich in biodiversity and carbon stock despite 
activities such as logging (Murdiyarso et al. 2011; Wells & Paoli 2011).  Without clear 
definitions documents such as the moratorium remain open to interpretation and can lack 
the effectiveness to support the intentions behind the document.   
Regardless of issues with the moratorium's exceptions, wording, and how forest 
area was afforded protection by it, the intent behind it was to make it more difficult for 
companies to obtain licenses for agricultural purposes or mining on area with forest 
cover.  As such, it may have contributed to the increase in deforestation rate by 
motivating certain parties to convert institutionally recognized official forest into non-
institutionally recognized forest (APL), as demonstrated by the examples discussed in the 




recognized forest being converted into non-institutionally recognized forest, which 
occurred after the moratorium was announced (Murdiyarso et al. 2011). These converted 
areas are more vulnerable to conversion as it is easier to obtain licenses in them for non-
forest purposes.  
2.7 Conclusions: Prospects for the future 
This article investigates the realities of forest management and some of the 
reasons behind the increasing rate of deforestation in Indonesia since the introduction of 
REDD+. Forest policy and governance in Indonesia is complex and resistant to change. 
Changes in forest policy often happen at the national level and are not always 
immediately or effectively adopted at the local level as a result of the decentralized 
governance system in Indonesia. This has lead in the years following REDD+’s 
introduction, to forest management being conducted in a business as usual mode despite 
some policy changes. Other reasons behind the increase in the deforestation rate include 
potential leakage1 resulting from institutionally recognized forest being converted to non-
institutionally recognized forest (Ekadinata et al. 2010), complex forest tenure 
(Resosudarmo et al., 2014), and weak & complicated forest governance. While recent 
efforts, such as the moratorium, have been made by the GoI to strengthen forest 
governance the increasing rate of deforestation reflects the difficulty in making 
significant change. Initial reports from Global Forest Watch indicate that the rate of 
deforestation in Indonesia has continued to increase into 2013 and 2014, and it is likely 
that with the recent devastating forest fires of 2015 this number will again be higher than 
in previous years.  
                                                
1 Leakage is defined as protecting forests in one area causing deforestation in another area (United Nations 




Despite this, the discourse about improving forest governance has increased and 
along with it new regulations that have the potential to improve forest governance and 
signal there may be hope for Indonesia's forests and the stakeholders that depend on 
them. While the majority of stakeholders interviewed indicated some level of fatigue and 
doubt regarding REDD+, ultimately REDD+ may offer the greatest benefit in its role as a 
catalyst towards change. REDD+ seems to have initially increased the amount of 
attention paid to forestry issues in Indonesia (Cronin & Santoso, 2010). It is also 
important to recognize that the Indonesian government has made strides in recent years, 
and is continuing to demonstrate commitment to this issue (Parlina, 2015).   
Based on our assessment of forest governance efforts in the wake of the 
introduction of REDD+ the main areas for governance reform to be targeted for future 
endeavors should include strengthening governance and increased clarity of regulations 
and policies.  The could be done by increasing sanctions and clarifying who has the 
authority to issue them as well as continuing to untangle tenure issues through efforts 
such as the One Map.  
Governance reform can be a long and unwieldy process, but by focusing on areas 
identified as problematic there may be hope for future efforts. For instance, some 
research indicates that inclusive decision making and increased monitoring & 
transparency could lead to improvements in decentralized governments (Suwarno et al., 
2015). Indonesia has also increased focus on a national monitoring system using remote 
sensing (Roswintiarti et al. 2013), which has the potential to help improve accountability 




Chapter 3: Challenges for successful outcomes at REDD+ project sites 
in Indonesia  
3.1 Introduction 
The United Nation’s (UN) Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest 
Degradation (REDD) program has been introduced in over 29 countries around the 
world, with financial and logistical support from many other international actors and 
institutions. It was developed initially as a way to reduce carbon emissions by providing 
financial support to developing nations for carbon sequestration resulting from reduced 
deforestation and forest degradation, and later evolved to include co-benefits to carbon 
sequestration, such as biodiversity and strengthening indigenous community rights 
(REDD+).  How exactly this support will be distributed and how projects materialize has 
been determined based on each country’s governance and forest scenario (Holloway and 
Giandomenico 2009). Skepticism and doubts about REDD+ have developed due to the 
numerous challenges that have arisen with the implementation of such an complex and 
involved undertaking (Edwards, Koh, and Laurance 2012; Mabele and Scheba 2016).  
Despite these doubts international efforts towards, and financial support for REDD+, 
continue (Parlina 2015; Johannsdottir and McInerney 2016). Many different studies have 
looked at how REDD+ is being implemented on the ground (Bolin and Tassa 2012; 
Burgess et al. 2010; Sills et al. 2014; Sunderlin, Ekaputri, et al. 2014; Peskett, 
Schreckenberg, and Brown 2011; Naughton-Treves and Day 2012) in an attempt to 
pinpoint areas for improvement and pathways forward. While there is an extensive body 
of literature on REDD+ in Indonesia (Dixon and Challies 2015; Agung et al. 2014; 
Santosa, Khatarina, and Suwana 2013) and elsewhere (Naughton-Treves and Day 2012; 




projects continue to develop in many places. Field research on the development of 
REDD+ projects has the potential to clarify existing challenges and inform future 
activities.  
This article contributes to the REDD+ and forest governance literature by 
identifying and describing the major components that can be used to assess REDD+ 
projects in Indonesia in their efforts towards achieving desired outcomes of reduced 
emissions from forest degradation and deforestation and biodiversity preservation. These 
components were chosen through review of the relevant literature and policy as well as 
the results of fieldwork in Indonesia with REDD+ stakeholders. The challenges 
associated with these factors, and the potential they have to affect outcomes of carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity preservation will be assessed using examples from our 
research on three case studies of existing REDD+ demonstration projects in Indonesia.  
The insight on REDD+ provided by this research is needed globally, but also 
specifically for Indonesia – a country with the third largest tropical forest in the world, 
one of the highest global deforestation rates (Hansen et al. 2013), and a complicated 
forest governance approach (Galudra et al. 2011; Indrarto et al. 2012). While these 
characteristics have made implementation of REDD+ there challenging, Indonesia’s 
Government has expressed enthusiasm for and engaged in REDD+ since 2008.  Since 
that time over 40 REDD+ projects have been identified on the ground.  In Indonesia, 
there is no single template for how a REDD+ project can or should be organized. The 
National framework on REDD+ provides an outline that offers many different ways for a 
REDD+ project to be designed and so there is a great deal of variation among projects, 




among projects there are some essential common factors among all projects that are 
essential to achieving REDD+ outcomes, such as those described in this article. By 
assessing these common factors at different project sites there is a potential for 
identifying some of the major challenges to implementation and opportunities for the 
future.  Using three case studies from different provinces in Indonesia, we are able to 
illustrate how challenges to REDD+ success can play out across a diverse landscape of 
locations and contexts.  
3.2.1  Methods and case study sites 
Data collection was undertaken from 2012 to 2014 in the form of participant 
observation, interviews, and a review of relevant forest policy. The ethnographic research 
was supplemented by a range of other sources including newspaper and other media 
reports, research publications, grey literature, and policy documents in order to 
understand the context of REDD+ stakeholder experiences and potential disconnects 
between the literature and what was happening on the ground. Reliable information 
concerning the realities of REDD+ and forestry in Indonesia can be difficult to obtain and 
differences between public pronouncements and official documents and the reality on the 
ground is often stark. Thus, triangulating the data in this way –spanning the full spectrum 
of forest policy from international to local scales – and combining multiple sources with 
interviews among stakeholder groups, provides insight into how international and 
national initiatives manifest themselves on the ground, increases the validity of the 
data(Decrop 1999) and helps to bridge the gap between literature, policy and reality.  
This fieldwork took place at varying scales– international, national, local. The 




observation involves site visits, or spending time at fieldwork sites and with informants to 
collect data through the observation of activity and phenomena related to the topic of 
research (Bernard 2006).  For the purposes of this study participant observation included 
time spent at each project site with project organizers, forest communities, and by 
attending relevant meetings at local sites and in national level policy contexts. In addition 
to general site visits, participant observation was carried out at meetings between 
villagers and project organizers; among project organizers; among villagers; and by visits 
to the project sites. Nine meetings were attended which were specifically related to one of 
the case study sites, and nine other meetings that were relevant to more general REDD+ 
issues were also attended. At these meetings extensive notes were taken, and they were 
sometimes recorded and transcribed. Notes and transcriptions from meetings were used in 
the development of themes for coding, but not included in the coding process itself.   
Interviewees were all stakeholders of REDD+. For the purposes of this research 
stakeholders are defined as someone who is currently, or has previously been, somehow 
involved directly in the REDD+ program. Initial interviewees were selected on the basis 
of the extent of their involvement in REDD+ activities, and from there a chain referral 
and preferential sampling method was used (Bernard 2006). Interviews were conducted 
with 71 stakeholders from a variety of stakeholder groups: donors, project managers, 
employees and heads of non-governmental organizations (NGOs), government officials 
& policy makers, members of civil society organizations, academic researchers, and 
community leaders and members. Of the 71 interviewees, 30 stakeholders were directly 
involved with one of the case study sites and 41 were general stakeholders involved in 




interviews were conducted in English, but when necessary interviews were conducted in 
Bahasa Indonesia, or with the assistance of a local translator.   
Informal semi-structured interviews are conducted with a standardized list of 
questions that are then followed up with further probing and exploration of important 
topics as they are introduced by the informant’s response (Bernard 2006). Informal semi-
structured interviews are beneficial for research, such as this, that includes respondents 
that demonstrate a wide array of experiences and perspectives (e.g., government officials, 
project organizers, forest communities, etc.). These types of interviews provide structure 
among all of the interviews while still allowing for variation when an informant provides 
key information that can be explored in more depth. The interviews consisted of 
approximately five to seven standardized questions developed based on relevant literature 
and preliminary scoping fieldwork, a copy of which can be found in Appendix A.  These 
questions were usually followed by additional questioning to further explore any key 
topics brought up during the interview. Interviews began with broad questions aimed at 
getting a general understanding of each respondent’s experiences with REDD+, and 
further probing of challenges, successes, or perceptions of the program.   
When possible interviews were recorded with permission of the respondent, and 
in the case of the few exceptions meticulous notes were taken of the interview. Interviews 
were transcribed and entered into a TAMS Analyzer database in order to apply a 
grounded theory approach to analyzing the data (Charmaz and Belgrave 2002; Charmaz 
2006). Grounded theory and inductive coding methods use a bottom up, rather than top 
down, approach and involve using data collected for the study in order to form a 




inductive coding method (Corbin and Strauss 2007)  interview and meeting transcripts 
were reviewed at various stages of data collection in order to develop a list of coding 
categories based on recurring themes and issues mentioned by respondents. All interview 
transcripts were coded using these categories. The themes that emerged from the 
interviews were compared with literature and policy review to identify factors that can 
provide insight into achieving success in REDD+. These themes were also used to 
ascertain the major challenges for the projects in our case study in regards to these 
factors.    
Maps of Case Study Sites  
Rimba Raya maps courtesy of (SCS Global Services (SCS) 2013) 





Rimba Raya Concession map 
 
Kapuas Hulu Maps courtesy of Forest and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME), 



















3.2.2 Case study sites 
After initial consultations with REDD+ stakeholders, researchers, and policy 
makers, the three REDD+ projects discussed here were chosen as suitable case study 
sites. These three were chosen from the 40 projects that have been started in Indonesia as 
a representative sample because they demonstrate characteristics representative of other 
projects throughout Indonesia. The three sites also have differences amongst each other 
that illustrate different perspectives on challenges and opportunities experienced by other 
projects throughout Indonesia. Each case study site is funded in a different way, which  
illustrates how different projects obtain, or fail to obtain, financing.  Each of these 
projects were created with a different intention, which demonstrates some of how 
projects in Indonesia come to be and structured somewhat differently. They also have 
commonalities amongst each other and with projects throughout Indonesia that offer a 
basis for comparison. Each of these sites is fairly prominent and well known in the 
REDD+ context, and has also been identified at some point as being an “official” 
REDD+ project in Indonesia. While this is one characteristic that was important for our 
sample of case studies, the status as an official REDD+ project actually means little more 
than recognition as such by various stakeholders.  These three projects also provide 
varying perspectives on challenges and opportunities as experienced by REDD+ projects 
throughout Indonesia. In cases where they were less able to achieve success with the 
criteria it provides a helpful contrast for identifying opportunities for improvement.  
The complexity of Indonesia’s governance system provides a complicated 
background for forest conservation activities (Galudra et al. 2011; Enrici and Hubacek 




be, and have been, started by stakeholders at a variety of scales – international (as in the 
case with the UN REDD+ pilot program), national, district, and project level. Some of 
these initiatives were adopted as a way to gain more support for already planned, or 
underway, conservation activities. Others were undertaken in an effort to start new 
projects that could theoretically take advantage of the new funding and support that the 
introduction of REDD+ might offer.  As a result, there are some projects and efforts in 
Indonesia identifying with REDD+, but which may vary in both design and goals from 
the initial idea of REDD+.  
There are multiple ways that a REDD+ project can form –based on existing 
conservation projects, within national parks, based on community forest areas, or as an 
Ecosystem Restoration Concession (ERC). ERC licenses are issued specifically for 
production forests, which are designated for industrial use by the Ministry of Forestry and 
experience extremely high rates of deforestation (Margono et al. 2014; Margono et al. 
2012). Thus these projects have the potential to play a particularly important role in 
reducing deforestation in Indonesia. REDD+ projects are also needed in the case of 
already running conservation projects that may need more funding, or in National Parks, 
which in Indonesia are still quite vulnerable to degradation (Yuliani et al. 2010; Gaveau 
et al. 2013; Gaveau et al. 2007). Two of the projects included here, Hutan Harapan and 
Rimba Raya, are ERCs and were designed with the intention of taking advantage of new 
funding and policy opportunities offered by REDD+. The other project, Kapuas Hulu, is 
a community based forest conservation initiative that seeks to take advantage of the 
opportunities for recognition by local and national governments that have been created by 




 The first case study site, Harapan Rainforest, is located in Jambi, Sumatra and 
was initiated by three conservation organizations -- Burung Indonesia, BirdLife 
International, and the Royal Society for the Protection of Birds. These three organizations 
started a private ecosystem restoration company, PT Restorasi Ekosistem Indonesia (PT 
REKI), in order to obtain an ERC license since ERC’s can only be obtained by a private 
entity in Indonesia.  Harapan was the first ERC license to be issued by the MoF in 2008. 
Harapan was initiated by these conservation organizations hoping to use REDD+ as a 
way to achieve conservation goals broadly oriented towards protecting various species of 
birds and their habitats. The basis for Harapan’s ERC license is that they will help restore 
the ecosystem, which has been severely degraded over the past 50 years (Buergin 2016). 
Part of the plan for achieving this is to undertake afforestation efforts as well as prevent 
further use of the area for logging or palm oil. Sumatra has faced significant rates of 
deforestation over the past 50 years – with a decrease in natural forest cover from 58 
percent in 1985 to 29 percent in 2008 (Uryu et al. 2010). Timber extraction in Sumatra 
has been a cause of degradation for decades (Kissinger et al. 2012), and oil palm 
dominates much of the landscape throughout the island (Koh et al. 2011). Jambi was 
chosen as a focus province for REDD+ implementation by the REDD+ Agency and the 
United Nations Office for REDD+ Coordination in Indonesia (UNORCID). Both 
UNORCID and the REDD+ Agency2 had planned to open offices in the provincial capital 
of Jambi City.  
However, while Harapan was initially designated and recognized by relevant 
agencies as a REDD+ project, it has since chosen to disassociate with the REDD+ 
                                                
2 Since the time of our fieldwork the REDD+ Agency has been slated to be merged with the new Ministry 




program. This disassociation came as a result of the negative attention and controversy 
(REDD Monitor 2014) that PT REKI felt the project received as a result of their 
association with REDD+, and is evidenced by their lack of mention of REDD+ on their 
website (PT REKI 2016). Unlike many of Sumatra's lowland forests which have been 
converted wholesale into palm oil, Harapan was previously a logging concession, and 
was logged legally until 2007 (Beckert et al. 2014).  Having been a site for timber 
extraction in the 1970s, the 98,000 ha area of tropical forest has, like much of Sumatra, 
faced degradation over the past 50 years.  Yet, Harapan is still widely considered to be a 
hotspot for biodiversity (Hoffman 2014). As a result, much of the Harapan ecosystem is 
generally considered salvageable, and the current REDD+ project is directed towards 
restoration of the area. The indigenous forest communities in the area, the Batin 
Sembilan, were at some point nomadic but in recent years shrinking territory from 
increasing palm oil plantations and government resettlement programs have encouraged 
less movement among the communities (Colchester et al. 2011) and many have had to 
settle in the Harapan project site.  
The second project, Kapuas Hulu, is located in Kalimantan Barat, or West 
Kalimantan. The Kapuas Hulu project was initiated by an aid organization with the 
intention of using the logistical advantages created by REDD+, such as recognition by the 
local government, to undertake a community based conservation project. The REDD+ 
project here is facilitated by the Forest and Climate Change Programme (FORCLIME), 
as part of the Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ). The 
project in this area is not an ERC, but is instead based on a cluster of Dayak villages and 




between two National Parks- Danau Sentarum and Betung Kerihun. The exact number of 
hectares included in the project have not been disclosed publicly.   
The project is located in the Indonesian area of Borneo, Kalimantan - the second 
most heavily forested of Indonesia's seven major islands, and the province of West 
Kalimantan contains the largest intact forest on the island (Margono et al. 2014). The 
extent of West Kalimantan is approximately 14 million ha and has 8.8 million hectares of 
government designated forest area, 5 million ha of which are designated for timber 
production (Yasmi et al. 2006). Kalimantan has experienced high levels of deforestation 
(Gaveau et al. 2016) as a result of industrial activity such as the rapid expansion of palm 
oil plantations (Carlson et al. 2013). Kapuas Hulu, also the name of the district where the 
project is located, is a heavily forested district in the province of KalBar, it shares a 
border with Malaysia and is located over 500 kilometers from the capital city of 
Pontianak.  
The third project is located in another of Kalimantan’s provinces, Central 
Kalimantan, the province that experienced the second highest rate of deforestation from 
2000 to 2008 (Broich et al. 2011). Rimba Raya, like Harapan, is also an ERC, and so run 
by a private entity, Infinite Earth, which was founded with the express purpose of 
creating a business based on conservation of the forest. Rimba Raya, the company’s first 
project, was initiated in order to take advantage of the business opportunities suggested 
by REDD+. The project area of Rimba Raya, covers ~64,000 hectares and borders 
Tanjung Puting National Park, providing a buffer zone to the park from nearby palm oil 
plantations. Tanjung Puting and Rimba Raya are both habitats for the endangered Borneo 




REDD+, though several large REDD+ projects there, such as Rimba Raya have struggled 
to obtain ERC licenses (Walsh et al. 2012). Rimba Raya began petitioning for its ERC 
permit in 2010, spent several years navigating the bureaucratic process, and was finally 
granted one in 2013. The majority of the villages involved in the Rimba Raya project are 
local Dayak ethnic groups. 
Two of the case study sites, Harapan and Rimba Raya are ERCs and being run as 
more traditional payment for ecosystem services projects (Pagiola and Platais 2016). The 
other, Kapuas Hulu, does not have a unified forest concession and is more focused on 
forest conservation through community empowerment. All three of the projects have 
experienced some success and some challenges along the way, though where they have 
had the most success and the faced the biggest challenges varies with each project. In the 
following sections the major characteristics of REDD+ projects that are essential for 
achieving successful outcomes are financial viability, community involvement, 
enforcement of project boundaries, and independent monitoring. Each of these will be 
discussed in turn, related to the case study sites and finally compared with outcomes of 
carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Harapan and Rimba Raya both had to 
face the challenge of obtaining ERC licenses, which is discussed further below. They 
have also faced challenges with enforcement of project boundaries and obtaining longer-
term financing. Rimba Raya has had the most success in obtaining funding from the 
carbon market, and can be seen as an example of what is possible for REDD+ projects. 
The Kapuas Hulu project is not an ERC, and so has not faced the same challenges in 
terms of licensing or funding but they must deal with the problem of tenure insecurity 




worked collaboratively with the communities involved in the project, there has been less 
opportunity for this kind of collaboration at Harapan where the communities have been 
marginalized for many years before the project began.  At Rimba Raya there is some 
stakeholder fatigue among communities, though there is some level of community 
involvement.  At the time of our research Kapuas Hulu and Harapan were not undergoing 
independent monitoring of their forest cover, biodiversity levels, or community 
involvement – something that Rimba Raya had undergone successfully.  As a result, 
Rimba Raya is the only one of the three projects that is able to definitively demonstrate 
positive outcomes for carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation.  The following 
sections provide further detail on each input factor and the case study sites. 
3.3 Success factors for REDD+ project sites 
Table 2: Criteria for REDD+ projects in Indonesia  
 Criteria 
 








Harapan - - - - +/? 
Rimba Raya +/- +/- + + + 
Kapuas Hulu +/- + - +/- +/? 
Key 
+:	achieved some success 
+/-: some success but still facing some challenges 







These criteria were chosen by using initial evaluation of participant observation 
and major themes derived from interview transcripts, combined with literature and policy 
review. Even though REDD+ demonstration activities all more or less aim to achieve 
some level of carbon sequestration and forest conservation they all also have varying 
degrees of emphasis on three components – community involvement, carbon 
sequestration, and biodiversity preservation. Regardless of this variation among projects, 
there are some common factors identified here as necessary for achieving successful 
REDD+ outcomes. These include: financial viability, community involvement, 
monitoring and enforcement of project boundaries , and are discussed here as to how they 
ultimately can impact the ability of a REDD+ project to successfully achieve carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity preservation goals. In the following sections each of these 
topics and how they relate to the projects involved in this case study are discussed in 
more detail.  
3.3.1 Financial viability 
Frequently mentioned by respondents in our study, being able to secure long-term 
funding is something which remains tenuous for many REDD+ projects in Indonesia, and 
is also a challenge elsewhere (Dixon and Challies 2015; Well and Carrapatoso 2016). 
Despite the importance of sufficient long-term funding for REDD+ projects, the topic is 
something that is not always sufficiently addressed in the conservation literature (Phelps 
et al. 2011) and policy discussions (Vijge et al. 2016).  As a result of varying access to 
carbon markets, and differing initial goals, various projects in Indonesia have different 




sufficient funding, the issue is important to discuss for REDD+ in Indonesia because of 
the stark contrast between some initial perceptions of large financing opportunities 
among some stakeholders and the absence of funding on the ground. The perception of 
large funding opportunities likely exists because of large sums promised by foreign 
governments (Government of Norway and Government of Indonesia 2010; Barrett and 
Goldstein 2016). The mismatch between the initial perception of funding opportunities 
and the availability of finance may have led some REDD+ projects to develop before the 
financial component was secured.   
Financial viability is an essential, seemingly obvious, component of a REDD+ 
project, yet many respondents from our research report that the lack of sufficient funding 
from a REDD+ mechanism or the carbon market has left many projects to the task of 
searching for funding from other areas.  For the purposes of this discussion, we will 
define financial viability as having, or a reasonable trajectory for obtaining, enough funds 
to keep the project operational and continue into the future. While the exact amount of 
time that may define “future” will differ from project to project, many projects in 
Indonesia must search for long-term funding because of the nature of ERCs in Indonesia. 
ERCs in Indonesia have terms for at least 60 years, and sometimes for as long as 99 years 
or longer. The ERC permit obtained by both Rimba Raya and Harapan rainforest is a 
license for operating a REDD+ type program on production forest (forest marked for 
private use, logging, palm oil, mining, etc.). This kind of license gives the holders of the 
license rights to the land for an extended period of time and includes an agreement for a 
licensing fee paid to the central Indonesian government. As Walsh et al. put it, 




Applications for an ER [license] must include a business plan that outlines how revenue 
will be generated over the life of the concession [license], which may exceed 100 years.” 
(Walsh et al. 2012, p36). The amount required for these payments is substantial, and adds 
onto the costs already associated with running a REDD+ project. Licensing fees, for 
example, have been reported to range from 0.6million USD (Indriatmoko et al. 2014) to 
1.4 million USD (Walsh et al. 2012). 
REDD+ is fundamentally a payment for ecosystem service (PES) scheme in 
which the initial idea was to provide payment for carbon sequestration.  Traditional ideas 
for payment for ecosystem services schemes include buyers and sellers and attempt to 
internalize the externalized nature from the economy, yet many REDD+ demonstration 
activities have deviated from this structure (Peskett et al. 2011). In Indonesia as well, 
REDD+ “buyers” are not present for many of the sellers, and so many demonstration 
activities face challenges in securing sufficient funding and often turn to alternative 
funding options, outside of carbon payments. While carbon markets have begun to gain 
momentum in recent years (Hamrick et al. 2015) commodification of carbon has still 
proven problematic because of failures to set global carbon prices (Kalkuhl et al., 2015) 
and carbon offsets projects do not always have the potential for  financially solvency 
(Gerrit Cornelis van Kooten, Bogle, and de Vries 2015).  The result is carbon markets 
that cannot provide sufficient and accessible funding for many stakeholders attempting to 
implement REDD+ projects. Furthermore the economics of carbon sequestration may not 
provide sufficient funding for competition with other potential forest land uses (van 
Kooten and Johnston, 2016; Butler et al., 2009).  




implement, in part because of the complexities associated with carbon finance 
mechanisms. For one, a growing forest actively sequesters more carbon than a mature 
one (van Kooten and Johnston 2016). However, biodiversity preservation is also an 
important aspect of REDD+, and so baselines must be established in order to demonstrate 
the value of standing forests though in many cases globally they have not yet been 
established (Virah-Sawmy et al. 2015). Because of this looking exclusively at how much 
carbon is sequestered for financial compensation could potentially encourage those 
seeking money from REDD+ initiatives to deforest or degrade an area in order to obtain 
more funding. Thus, many projects must not just actively demonstrate the increase of 
carbon stock in an area but moreover need to prevent existing carbon stocks from being 
released into the atmosphere through deforestation or degradation of that land. This is 
exactly what is happening in many cases projects are preventing old growth forest from 
being degraded or cleared by other potential land uses, such as palm oil or mining. In 
these cases, they are demonstrating additionality, or that the benefits would not have 
occurred under a business as usual scenario (Melo et al. 2014).  
From our case study, Rimba Raya fits under this category, and to some extend so 
do Kapuas Hulu and Harapan. However, Harapan’s forest cover was degraded before the 
concession became an ERC so there is some potential for further sequestration as the 
forest is restored. At the time of this research, neither the Kapuas Hulu nor Harapan have 
done an independent audit to establish baselines, as Rimba Raya has done. A baseline for 
emissions reduction and forest cover must be established for projects, in order to provide 
a starting point for assessing total carbon stock in an area and facilitate monitoring of a 




for certain types of funding, because it can then be used to calculate the total amount of 
carbon credits that a REDD+ project might have to sell on the carbon market.  The lack 
of a robust carbon market, however, means that projects often do not have opportunities 
to find funding through this avenue, regardless of established baselines and carbon stock. 
There are other entities besides the carbon market that can potentially provide 
funding for REDD+ projects, though in some cases these too have proven difficult to 
access. The World Bank’s Carbon Fund is active in Indonesia, and has been engaged in 
developing about a dozen projects around the country but is not currently providing 
funding to other projects in Indonesia outside of the fund. Although Norway has 
promised funds for countries involved in REDD+, 1 billion USD in the case of Indonesia, 
the disbursement of those funds is predicated on demonstrable results, which to date have 
not yet been actualized (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta 2016). 
As there is no single readily accessible REDD+ funding mechanism in Indonesia, 
project organizers must turn to other options in order to generate long-term financing. 
And while evaluating a project based on its involvement in the carbon market may be too 
strict a measure of success, at the very least a project must have access to, or a plan for 
finding, sustained funding for the present and future. Many projects were initiated in the 
hope of securing funding from either the carbon markets, or a REDD+ finance 
mechanism, but in many cases funding has remained elusive. Finding sufficient and 
sustained funding has become a challenge for many projects – one particularly striking 
example can be found with the United Nations’ REDD+ Pilot Project in Indonesia, which 
lists a lack of funding as one of the two main reasons for its eventual demise (UN-REDD 




According to the National framework for REDD+, demonstration projects in 
Indonesia may be initiated by a variety of stakeholders – communities, NGOs, or private 
entities. Finance sources will be determined by the pathways for funding available to the 
project organizers, something that varies greatly for various REDD+ projects in 
Indonesia. Although all of the projects included in this case study had secured some level 
of funding, the process of obtaining long-term and sufficient funding was one of the most 
frequently mentioned challenges by the stakeholders included in our fieldwork from the 
case studies as well as those involved at varying scales of operation involved in other 
REDD+ projects.  
At the time of this research, the Rimba Raya project was the only REDD+ project 
in Indonesia having secured funding from the carbon market.  Rimba Raya stated that 
half of their 10 million tons of certified emissions reductions had been sold, but 
according to project organizers that only ensures funding for the near-term future. The 
rest of the credits still need to be sold in order to sustain the project over the long-term of 
the ERC license. While acknowledging the difficulties that a lack of general funding 
sources have created, project organizers attribute their success to approaching REDD+ as 
a business. Doing so has meant persevering even when faced with seemingly 
insurmountable challenges and spending as little as possible on unnecessary costs, and 
prioritizing what is important and necessary. As one project organizer put it, “People that 
are typically involved in REDD have very little business experience. So at this stage of 
the game…the only people who have succeeded are primarily people who have business 
experience… if you’re not very results based or very focused on what’s important and 




because of what [running] a business requires...There’s no room for error. But I see 
people here, they get their money from the clouds and they spend it because it’s not 
theirs. And we spend our own money. People that invested in us and trusted in us, so we 
couldn’t lose that money.” In terms of financial viability, Rimba Raya has had as much 
success as any REDD+ project in Indonesia in obtaining their own funding.  
Some projects, such as the Kapuas Hulu project, have a reliable and somewhat 
long-term funding source outside of the carbon markets. The Kapuas Hulu project in 
KalBar is run by GIZ’s FORCLIME project which has secured a ~26million USD grant 
through KfW Bankengruppe, a German government-owned development bank.  This 
offers an example of a pathway for REDD+ projects to have financial viability – through 
donor organizations that are willing to offer substantial funding for a project. In the case 
of a REDD+ project that is not being organized as an ERC, the need for sustained long-
term funding is not as urgent as for those that are ERCs. And while this kind of direct 
donor funding is not always available for some projects, it is for others. In the case of the 
Kapuas Hulu project, the funding was part of GIZ’s budget and therefore obtained before 
the project was undertaken.  There are some other projects that are set to receive funding 
from the World Bank’s Carbon Fund, in a similar manner to the Kapuas Hulu project.  
The case of Harapan most clearly illustrates the difficulties in securing sufficient 
long-term funding, an issue both recognized in the literature (Dixon and Challies 2015; 
Streck 2012; Busch 2013; Vijge et al. 2016; Phelps 2011) and widely reported by 
respondents from our research outside of these three case studies. In an experience 
similar to what has been reported in the literature (UN-REDD Programme 2013) and by 




secured through the carbon market, the ‘Norway money’, or the U.N. REDD+ program 
itself, but later when financing did not materialize funding alternatives had to be sought. 
One respondent, associated with another project outside of these case studies put it like 
this, “We’re trying for REDD, but we feel left out…it’s hard to find funding and 
sometimes we ask ourselves, what’s in it for those of us running the project?” At the time 
of our research, Harapan reports their only avenues for securing funding outside of the 
carbon market were from various donors, which have included: Danish International 
Development Agency (DANIDA), the German International Climate Initiative (ICI), 
Singapore Airlines, and through non-timber forest products (NTFPs) (such as gaharu, 
handicrafts, honey, etc.).  Neither these donors nor the non-timber forest products are 
providing a long-term option for sufficient funding to sustain the project.  This has left 
the project with the challenging task of securing alternate funding while also trying to 
successfully implement other project goals and tasks. Alternate sources of revenue such 
as these often cannot provide sufficient financing for a project to remain economically 
viable –and certainly cannot compete with other potential land uses, support the costs of 
project maintenance, and last over a100year term of an Indonesian ERC. 
3.3.2 Community Involvement 
While fair and equitable community involvement has been acknowledged as a 
crucial part of REDD+ and other climate change mitigation programs (UNFCCC 2010), 
in many places community involvement in REDD+ has not been sufficient (Lawlor et al. 
2013; Danielsen et al. 2013; Bayrak and Marafa 2016) and some of the projects included 
in our case study reflect this as well. Early on in REDD+ the importance of involving 




frameworks (UN REDD Programme 2011; IRTF 2012; Howell 2015). There is 
increasing evidence to support the positive effect of involving communities in successful 
forest management endeavors (Stevens et al. 2014; Molnar et al., 2004).  While there is 
still some debate that assuring community rights will necessarily result in successful 
long-term forest management (Resosudarmo et al. 2014), doing so at least has the 
potential to improve chances of long-term project success (Agrawal and Angelsen 2009; 
Stevens et al. 2014).   Furthermore, it is almost universally agreed that projects must 
involve communities in a fair and equitable manner.  
Indonesia has a vast population of forest communities, estimates range between 
80 and 95 million, defined by the Forest Peoples Programme as “Indigenous peoples who 
depend primarily on natural…forests for their livelihoods…; rural people who live in or 
at the margin of natural forests or woodlands, who rely on the forest as a safety net or for 
supplemental income; smallholder farmers who grow farm trees or manage remnant 
forests for subsistence and income; artisans or employees in formal or informal forest 
based  enterprises” (Chao 2012, p 8). In order to ensure the fair treatment of the 
involvement of such communities in REDD+ a system was adopted called Free Prior and 
Informed Consent (FPIC). The idea behind this is to ensure that communities are 
involved, and truly understand what they are agreeing to with that involvement.  
While reasoning behind the provision of FPIC to communities is hard to disagree with, it 
has resulted in many communities being approached and informed about REDD+ long before 
projects could get up and running, and resulted in stakeholder fatigue. Stakeholder fatigue in 
forestry occurs when, “key stakeholders begin to drop out of the selection process due to lack of 
perceived progress” (Hagan and Whitman 2006,p 208). Mistrust towards, and doubt about, 




the case of a some projects working to obtain an ERC) was a theme commonly mentioned by 
community members included in our fieldwork. This is not something that is unknown to project 
organizers, as one put it, “ I think a lot of it too is that the stakeholders don’t believe in 
[REDD+]. So many have failed, so many have talked, then they don’t believe in it anymore. That 
was sort of us the last few years during the delay. Up until the delay, everybody was supportive, 
all of our community. Everything was full blast. But then the delay [happened], and they start 
wondering. But I think in general, worldwide, there’s a fatigue. There’s a lot of fatigue. People 
have heard and heard and heard.” – REDD+ project organizer 
Beyond initial involvement, the literature reports that community engagement and 
benefit distribution have proven complicated (Lawlor et al. 2013) which reflects the 
multi-faceted experience of the stakeholders included in this research. There are many 
questions that remain for stakeholders of REDD+, in Indonesia and elsewhere, about how 
to engage communities and how to distribute benefits.  For example -- should benefits 
come in the form of payments, or schools and access to medical care? how to ensure that 
benefits are not unevenly accumulated by certain members of the community? While the 
these questions have not yet been answered, many REDD+ project organizers, including 
those from our case studies, have had to address them as they have moved forward with 
REDD+ activities.  
The Rimba Raya concession is situated next to palm oil plantations, with 
communities located along the border, as a result these communities are engaged with 
both the palm oil company and Rimba Raya. Some of the communities have individuals 
employed by the palm oil company, and also may receive fuel for generators or other 




in deforestation in the area, they report having mixed feelings about the palm oil 
company. Rimba Raya’s plan for community benefits includes providing alternative 
employment opportunities, health care, clean drinking water, alternative fuel supplies and 
other infrastructure (Rimba Raya 2014). While not all of these benefits had been fully 
implemented at the time of data collection, an independent monitoring agency evaluates 
Rimba Raya’s community engagement to ensure these objectives are being met, which 
will be discussed further in the monitoring section below. Communities are also still 
allowed access to the forests for certain things: harvesting of non-timber forest products 
and for fishing using sustainable methods. As reflected by some community members 
engagement with the palm oil company, one challenge for Rimba Raya has been to get 
full engagement and support from these communities, some members of which have 
demonstrated feelings of fatigue towards the project after hearing about REDD+ for years 
without seeing what they feel are real results. Part of the reason for this may be due to the 
delay in Rimba Raya getting full approval for their ERC license. Rimba Raya provided 
FPIC to the communities upon the initial creation of the project as early as 2010 
(Indriatmoko et al. 2014) but as it then took three years for them to get the project 
running and secure the concession license, there was a delay in real implementation, 
resulting in stakeholder fatigue.  
Community involvement is the basis for the project in Kapuas Hulu, and of the 
three case study sites they have arguably had the most successful results in incorporating 
forest communities into their project. FORCLIME has undertaken a collaborative 
management approach and developed a strong working relationship with the Kapuas 




about, and choices in, project activities and direction. They also have employed 
community liaisons to work with FORCLIME staff and inform the community at large 
about updates for the project. Funding was given to each community involved in the 
project to supplement subsistence sources and income. Each community voted on what to 
do with the funding, choosing from a variety of non-timber forest products (coffee, 
agarwood, rubber, fish ponds, or vegetable gardens) and each community now has one or 
more of these underway. The main challenge facing Kapuas Hulu and community 
involvement has to do with the Indonesian system of land tenure and establishing 
community ownership of the forest, and is something characteristic of challenges for 
REDD+ projects and other aspects of forest management in Indonesia (Sunderlin et al. 
2014; Barr et al. 2006). More specifically in the case of Kapuas Hulu, there is currently a 
not-yet-activated palm oil license overlapping with the community forest.  Based on our 
interviews it seems that while the palm oil company has approached community members 
about activating their license, the community remains mostly against the development of 
palm oil in the area. While a few community members are enticed by the cash and jobs 
offered by the palm oil company, many other community members are suspicious. They 
have seen other areas converted to palm oil, and report that nearby communities, some of 
whom are relatives, are not pleased with the results – citing reports of a lack of fish and 
other items from the forests along with frequent flooding and other issues.  As one 
community member put it, “We do not want palm oil here, we know if we had it here we 
would not have clean water anymore.” As a result community support for protection of 
the forest remains strong. Yet, while FORCLIME’s REDD+ project demonstrates strong 




Community involvement has come with challenges for the Harapan project, as the 
Batin Sembilan have been marginalized and land conflicts have existed in the area long 
before the project was established (Colchester et al. 2011).  While some nomadic Batin 
Sembilan still reside inside within the concession, the nomadic tendencies of the Batin 
Sembilan have diminished with time, as a result of shrinking territory caused by the 
expansion of palm oil and government resettlement programs. Some of the Batin 
Sembilan now live in a permanent settlement that was developed with the assistance of 
the Harapan project, and according to many project organizers many community 
members have been drawn to the project site because of the diminished forest cover in 
the surrounding area. The Batin Sembilan still do not hold land rights to the area, though 
Harapan has established an agreement with the local communities living in and near the 
concession to allow use of parcels of land and collection of NTFPs. Communities have 
also been employed by the Harapan project to plant new trees, run the nursery, and guard 
the concession from encroachers. A small school and access to health care has been made 
available to all community members living in the Harapan concession. While the 
relationship between Harapan and the Batin Sembilan is generally amicable as reported 
by our respondents, there have also been disputes over land rights when customary 
leaders engaged in informal land trade agreements, resulting in conflicts (Beckert et al. 
2014).  
3.3.4 Enforcement of project boundaries 
In many countries where REDD+ is being implemented, achieving and 
maintaining effective capacity for local forest governance is a challenge (Minang et al. 




respondents from our study, many of whom described difficulties in enforcing boundaries 
within allegedly protected REDD+ project areas. Enforcement as used in this discussion 
is the ability of those running a REDD+ project to control forest cover change related 
activities within the boundaries of their project.  Maintaining capacity for governing over 
and enforcing project boundaries is essential for achieving project success in order to 
prevent widespread encroachment and forest degradation. Yet, a lack of ability to enforce 
boundaries of protected forest areas, such as REDD+ projects, is one of the challenges 
frequently mentioned in both the literature (Gaveau et al. 2013; Enrici and Hubacek 
2016) and by our respondents.  Enforcing boundaries of protected forest areas is 
something that is a problem in Indonesia for both REDD+ activities as well as national 
parks (Yuliani et al. 2010; Murdiyarso et al. 2011; Indonesia Ministry of Forestry 2014). 
The lack of ability to enforce project boundaries often manifests as illegal encroachment 
into project areas and when local authorities do not act on this encroachment, 
demonstrating a lack of support for projects. Such lack of support from authorities was 
reported by respondents as either failure to approve and enforce project boundaries, 
failing to take action against encroachers, or collusion of the authorities with encroachers.  
In the cases of our study sites, and elsewhere (Gaveau et al. 2013; Gaveau, 
Wandono, and Setiabudi 2007), encroachment has become substantial, and continues to 
grow over time.  In some cases smallholder palm oil encroachers claim to have been sold 
permits for the land, and identification of who sells the permits has been elusive. Other of 
these small holders are encouraged by large palm oil companies bordering project sites to 
encroach on the project concession. Once these smallholders have gained access to the 




When confronted by project organizers, they refuse to leave and retaliate if further action 
is taken. One project organizer put it like this, “They’re selling the land in our 
concession. And we’ve asked some of these people, “Oh, we bought the land. What can 
you show us?” And the only thing they can show us is that they paid money to 
somebody.” – REDD+ Project Organizer. Project organizers are not willing to engage in 
such a conflict, and without support from local authorities, they are left without any 
avenue for recourse. One project organizer explained it like this, “On our land, we have 
400 families that have arrived since 2008...they’re taking up over 5,000 hectares. They 
have churches, rice paddies, [a store]…how are we supposed to get rid of them? The 
authorities won’t do anything.”  
Additionally, if a REDD+ project is operating as an Ecosystem Restoration 
Concession, the company that is running the project must first get approval from the 
central government for the license, and then have the boundaries of the project approved, 
also by the central government. Once this happens, the local government must also then 
re-approve the boundaries set out by the project organizers and the central government.  
In some cases it has been reported by project organizers that local authorities have been 
slow or reluctant to do this. Some stakeholders from our research have suggested that this 
reluctance happens because of payments to authorities from the encroachers and a desire 
by authorities for payments from project organizers.  
During data collection, encroachment in the project sites and in other protected 
areas was observed in a number of ways – illegal logging, artisanal mining, and palm oil 
encroachment by both small-holders and large companies. Often encroachment can harm 




halted by local authorities, who may have different plans for the area other than what has 
been designated by the central government.  Local authorities are susceptible to 
corruption and often will accept bribes from encroachers. As one of our respondents 
described it, “The community that has been there for a long time welcomes our help to 
stop [the illegal logging] because in the old days, they could control who would take 
[from the forest]. Now there’s police operating with the illegal loggers. So if somebody 
[from the village] doesn’t cooperate, they’re put in jail. In fact, they actually put 
somebody from the village in jail because they refused to [work with the] illegal loggers 
and then confiscated [the community member’s] timber, took it and sold it.” Many 
respondents report that if facilitators of a REDD+ project want help from authorities in 
enforcing their project area, those authorities often want a bribe – which many projects 
are either unwilling or unable to give.  Lack of ability to enforce boundaries and 
encroachment was seen in all three case study sites, as discussed in more detail in the 
following paragraphs. 
All three of the case study sites face challenges with having the capacity to 
enforce project boundaries. The Rimba Raya project has experienced some 
encroachment, from both illegal loggers as well as palm oil. Rimba Raya has been able to 
keep encroachment at a level low enough to maintain their carbon certification, but it is a 
significant enough problem to warrant constant attention. Lack of support from local 
officials can be seen by the instances of encroachment that occur, and land use conflicts 
are endemic to the area (Indriatmoko et al. 2014). For example, illegal loggers enter the 
area, perhaps after purchasing “permission” to enter the area from someone not involved 




asked to leave, they expect to be compensated for the fee they have paid for “access” to 
the area.  The palm oil operation bordering Rimba Raya has also encroached on the 
concession, and encouraged community members to do so as well, in part encouraged by 
the local authorities failure to approve the border of the concession, as outlined by the 
project organizers and approved by the Ministry of Forestry.  Beyond this, there are also 
local authorities that have used part of the area inside the Rimba Raya concession for 
their own use, degrading the forest in the process. 
In the case of Kapuas Hulu, the challenge with enforcement of project boundaries 
differs from the other two case study sites. Strong relationships and a project built 
collaboratively with the local communities have meant that encroachment has not been 
reported as an issue for the project in Kapuas Hulu. Most of the project area is recognized 
community forest that has been established for a long time, and forest access and use are 
regulated by the local communities. Yet while the communities maintain authority over 
the project site, there is a major potential challenge for the Kapuas Hulu project due to 
the fact that the community forest overlaps with a palm oil concession. This kind of 
overlap is common throughout Indonesia, and is problematic for many forest governance 
scenarios (Steni and Hadad 2012; Stevens et al. 2014). As discussed above, the company 
that holds the license has been trying to gain community approval to activate their 
license. Although the legality of whether or not they can activate the concession is 
unclear, often palm oil companies want community approval in order to avoid conflict 
and violence. Many of the community leaders in Kapuas Hulu, and community members 
themselves are against palm oil development. They report having seen palm oil destroy 




are not held, and sources of livelihood are then gone, taken over by palm oil. While many 
of our respondents report that the palm oil company will not activate their license without 
support of the forest communities of Kapuas Hulu, the scenario does make their tenure 
over their forests vulnerable from a legal standpoint (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005).  
Encroachment remains a major challenge for Harapan towards achieving their 
goal of protecting & restoring the forest in their concession. There is a record of land use 
conflicts in the area and evidence that such conflicts may be increasing (Beckert et al. 
2014). While similar in nature to the challenges to governing agency at Rimba Raya, the 
encroachment in Harapan is more widespread. Harapan has experienced encroachment on 
a total of 18,758ha or 19.14 percent of the concessions total 98,000ha, and at an average 
encroachment rate of 2,623ha/year, could potentially have the entire project area 
deforested by encroachment over the next 40 years (Silalahi and Erwin 2015). There has 
also been a lack of support by local officials, as in the case of Rimba Raya. There are 
reported instances of the local authorities colluding with encroachers or expecting 
unofficial incentives from project organizers, something not allocated for in a budget at 
least partially funded by private entities and international aid agencies. Encroachment has 
occurred primarily by small holders from other areas of Indonesia. Often individuals are 
sold palm oil “permits” illegally for the area inside of Harapan. Without support from 
local authorities, Harapan is left to their own devices to deal with the encroachment. 
Many of these palm oil smallholders move in quickly and build makeshift homes on the 
land where they are planting. Once they have done this, it is nearly impossible for them to 
be ejected from the area by the project organizers as they are often willing to resort to 





Monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) is essential in order for a REDD+ 
project to overcome challenges, assess the impact of policies on the ground, avoid 
unintended consequences and prove to other stakeholders (particularly funders) that they 
are having, a net positive benefit for carbon sequestration and biodiversity (de Sassi et al. 
2015). While monitoring technology currently exists for meeting the needs of REDD+ 
(Goetz et al. 2015), not all countries have begun taking advantage of this technology.  
Many countries, and projects in Indonesia, have yet to establish baselines of carbon stock 
and for potential forest cover loss in business as usual scenarios (Virah-Sawmy et al. 
2015). The absence of these baselines make it difficult to evaluate projects solely based 
on their success in achieving emissions reductions. Baselines combined with effective 
monitoring are essential for demonstrating carbon sequestration, or emission prevention 
through additionality (preventing deforestation that would have happened under a 
business as usual scenario), biodiversity preservation, and even proper community 
involvement (de Sassi et al. 2015; Herold and Skutsch 2009). Establishing a baseline for 
proper monitoring of carbon stocks and deforestation rates allows for measurement of 
future rates of change, remote sensing provides one of the most efficient and rapid ways 
to achieve this (Pelletier and Goetz 2015). Monitoring of forest cover can to a large 
extent be done through remote sensing (Goetz et al. 2015), but even with the 
technological assistance of such methods, remote sensing still requires ground truthing. 
Many countries undertaking REDD+ may have the technology for such monitoring, but 
have yet to implement a MRV mechanism (Ochieng et al. 2016). Furthermore, thorough 
biodiversity and community monitoring require actual site visits. Safeguards have been 




biodiversity in forests. However, in many countries safeguards remain vague (Korwin 
and Rey 2015) and based on the literature (Steni and Hadad 2012) and the data collection 
for this research, this is no less true for Indonesia. Despite the importance of co-benefits 
and the necessity to monitor them, very little attention to date has been given to 
monitoring co-benefits (Vijge et al. 2016). Furthermore, the diversity of projects and their 
funding sources in Indonesia means that not all demonstration activities need or choose to 
adopt safeguards for ensuring co-benefits that have been created by entities such as the 
UN.   
Many countries and projects are still figuring out exactly how to set up an MRV 
system (Ochieng et al. 2016). Monitoring of carbon stocks can be done in a number of 
ways, including both community-based monitoring or monitoring by an independent 
agency. Community-based monitoring of forest cover over a number of years has proven 
to be accurate, cost-effective, and to increase community involvement in other aspects of 
forest management (Brofeldt et al. 2014). In cases where the community may not have 
enough members to monitor a very large REDD+ concession, other methods for 
monitoring must be used.   
Independent monitoring, such as that carried out using a carbon offset standard or 
remote sensing analysis, allows verification that projects are achieving what they say that 
they are. Monitoring must also include the community involvement and biodiversity 
aspects of projects to ensure that fair and equitable practices are being undertaken and 
that there is some assurance of the long-term viability of a project (Panfil and Harvey 
2015; de Sassi et al. 2015). Carbon offset standards are guidelines for monitoring, 




been numerous carbon offset standards developed (Kollmuss et al. 2008). The 
Community Climate and Biodiversity standard and Voluntary Carbon Standard are two 
monitoring entities recognized by the international carbon markets. The Voluntary 
Carbon Standard was formed by the Climate Group, International Emissions Trading 
Association (IETA) and The World Economic Forum and is now operating as an NGO.  
The Voluntary Carbon Standard focuses on evaluating projects for reduced greenhouse 
gas (GhG) emissions but partners with other standard verification schemes, such as 
Community Climate and Biodiversity, to provide projects with certification for carbon 
co-benefits. Community Climate and Biodiversity was created by the Climate, 
Community & Biodiversity Alliance, a collaboration among multiple NGOs 
(Conservation International, CARE, Rainforest Alliance, The Nature Conservancy and 
the Wildlife Conservation Society) interested in facilitating the effort towards climate 
change mitigation through reduction of deforestation and forest degradation.  The 
Community Climate and Biodiversity standards are used to evaluate project design (as 
opposed to verifying carbon stocks) by the three main components of community, climate 
and biodiversity while also assessing environmental and economic sustainability. While 
there have been concerns regarding the limitations of Community Climate and 
Biodiversity (Melo et al. 2014), this kind of monitoring and verification is essential for 
donors, including the developing carbon market, and interested stakeholders at all levels.  
Only one of the three projects observed for our research is currently being 
evaluated by an independent agency.  Rimba Raya has received certification from both 
Community Climate and Biodiversity and Voluntary Carbon Standard. In 2015 Rimba 




assessment of carbon stock, biodiversity levels, and their relationship with the 
communities on their concession (Infinite Earth - Rimba Raya 2015). This certification 
gives the project credibility when dealing with donors and the press. Neither of the other 
two projects has sought certification by a carbon offset standard entity. In the case of 
Kapuas Hulu, it may not be deemed necessary as the project already has funding 
provided. In the case of Harapan, it is unclear what prevents them from seeking 
certification. While it is possible that many REDD+ projects have successfully achieved 
carbon sequestration goals and co-benefits, having the certification of an independent 
monitoring agency such as VCS allows a project to demonstrate verified results to 
stakeholders of all categories (including funders and policy makers).  
3.3.6 Carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation 
While the other four factors discussed here are components of REDD+ projects 
that contribute to success, this final factor is an outcome – without which a project cannot 
claim to have achieved success in respect to the objectives of REDD+. All of the other 
components that have been discussed in this article up until this point can have an impact 
on how projects are able to achieve goals for carbon sequestration and biodiversity 
preservation. Carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation can be maintained or 
improved with sufficient financing, community collaboration, and the capacity to enforce 
project boundaries.  Monitoring allows a project to demonstrate that a project is achieving 
what it has set out to do, and successfully sequestering carbon and preserving 
biodiversity.  
The initial goal of REDD+ was to reduce carbon emissions by reducing 




acknowledged as an important component of this (Gibbs et al. 2007). In the initial period 
after REDD’s introduction, it became clear that having carbon sequestration alone as a 
goal is problematic. In fact some techniques for increasing carbon sequestration can lead 
to a decline in biodiversity levels (Putz and Redford 2009). Our discussion here will 
focus primarily on the carbon aspect of forest monitoring related to REDD+, but also 
acknowledge that biodiversity preservation is just as essential to success in REDD+.  
The Rimba Raya project has demonstrated success through carbon sequestration, 
independently verified by the Verified Carbon Standard. The report states, “…emission 
reductions from the Rimba Raya Biodiversity Reserve project for the period of 1 July 
2009 to 30 June 2010 amount to 2,181,352 tonnes of CO2 equivalent after a 10% buffer 
pool deduction amounting to 242,373 tonnes of CO2 equivalent is taken into 
consideration.” (SCS 2013, p 2). Rimba Raya demonstrates these outcomes of verified 
carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation through independent monitoring. 
Despite challenges the project has faced, this is supported by their successes in securing 
sufficient funding, collaborating with the communities, and having enough ability to 
enforce boundaries to improve carbon and biodiversity in the face of potential 
encroachment.  
For Kapuas Hulu, efforts towards community capacity building and 
empowerment may have reduced community forestry uses, which could in turn have 
resulted in an increase in, or maintenance of, carbon sequestration and biodiversity levels. 
Furthermore, these projects may also help empower the community to prevent the palm 
oil companies from being able to activate their licenses overlapping with the community 




organizers and the community have reported, the forest cover in the area has remained at 
a steady rate. These efforts are supported by the project’s funding and the communities’ 
ability to enforce project boundaries. However, without monitoring it is difficult to assess 
exactly how much carbon or biodiversity has been saved or gained since project 
inception.  
Harapan Rainforest was previously designated as a timber concession, and so it 
stands to reason that the carbon sequestration and biodiversity levels have improved there 
since PT REKI obtained the ERC license.  However, the lack of ability to enforce project 
boundaries and absence of independent monitoring indicates that there is uncertainty 
regarding this. It could be argued that all three sites have achieved some level of carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity preservation, at the very least preventing legal palm oil or 
logging to occur on project sites. However, this is harder or impossible to demonstrate in 
instances where monitoring has not been undertaken. Without independent monitoring of 
the site how much carbon and biodiversity levels have changed since the project began 
have not yet been demonstrated.   
3.4 Conclusions and Discussion 
From the perspective of forest governance, it is hard to argue that any kind of ERC or 
forest protection mechanism is not an improvement upon a mining, logging, or 
agriculture concession.  However, assessing the criteria that can help a project to achieve 
the outcome of carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation offers the opportunity 
to assess the major challenges and opportunities for REDD+ projects in Indonesia and 
potentially elsewhere. It is helpful to reflect on the similarities and differences among 




In terms of financial viability both Rimba Raya and Kapuas Hulu have established 
very different, yet stable funding situations.  Rimba Raya’s process of establishing their 
REDD+ project and selling carbon credits on the market provides a useful example of 
how a REDD+ project could be run, yet at the time of this research was the exception 
rather than the rule. Kapuas Hulu is representative of a number of other REDD+ projects 
throughout Indonesia that are started by NGOs or institutions that may already have 
funding available. However, the challenge that long-term financial viability presents for 
Harapan seems to be representative of the experience of many of our interviewees from 
outside the three case study sites, as well as the literature (UN-REDD Programme 2013; 
Dixon and Challies 2015).  
Community involvement varies at each site, though Kapuas Hulu presents an example 
of how a project might look when designed with collaborative management techniques, 
which have been successful for ecosystem management practices in other instances 
(Daniels and Walker 1996; Fisher 1995; Tania, Daniel, and Pfeffer 2003). Despite 
stakeholder fatigue, Rimba Raya has also developed a working relationship with verified 
co-benefits for communities within the project sites. Harapan rainforest faces a 
challenging situation with their communities, in good part because of the conflict and 
marginalization of those communities before the project began.   
In spite of tenure challenges, ability to enforce project boundaries could be argued to 
be the strongest in Kapuas Hulu because of collaboration with the forest communities 
who govern the forest area included in the project. While both Rimba Raya and Harapan 
face challenges with having governance agency, and the ability to prevent unsanctioned 




seems to be significantly worse for Harapan. This may at least partially have been a 
larger problem because the project area was being encroached upon before Harapan’s 
ERC was granted in 2008 (Silalahi and Erwin 2015). Harapan’s challenges in this regards 
could also potentially be attributed to, or compounded by, challenges with the other 
factors. Community involvement has been challenging, weakening the ability of those 
communities to enforce boundaries as is seen with Kapuas Hulu. Moreover, Harapan 
lacks funding and the flexibility to use funds to come up with alternative strategies for 
dealing with encroachment.   
Without monitoring it is hard for any project to claim improvements in forest cover, 
community benefits, or biodiversity levels. Yet despite this, independent monitoring may 
not always make sense for every project, as in the case of the Kapuas Hulu project where 
independent monitoring would be expensive and is unnecessary for securing funding. If a 
national level agency is established for monitoring forest cover, this will help with 
monitoring of projects. This is a distinct possibility as the technology for proper 
monitoring of REDD+ currently exists, and is going to continue to improve in coming 
years (Goetz et al. 2015).  
Carbon stock maintenance, or improvement, and biodiversity preservation are 
essential goals for any REDD+ project. They cannot be demonstrated without proper 
baselines and monitoring. Rimba Raya is the only project to demonstrate verified results. 
However, having an ERC license such as Harapan’s must be an improvement over any 
other kind of forest use license which, based on the evidence from other production forest 
areas (Margono et al. 2012), would likely result in significant forest cover loss. Despite 




success in improving forest cover in REDD+ projects will also likely require attention to 
the other criteria we have discussed here, such as funding, community involvement, and 
governing capacity.  The results of this research demonstrate that when there are 
challenges towards the inputs of financing, community involvement, governing capacity, 
and monitoring they can compound and ultimately prevent a project from achieving its 





Chapter 4: A REDD+ crisis of confidence: an ethnographic assessment 
of stakeholder experiences across scales 
“I mean, you just see the way people establish land claims…because land tenure is so 
screwed up in Indonesia, is people burn. So you just go and burn a section of forest and 
then you put up a sign that says “This is my land.” And you just go back and burn it 
periodically. So you see that everywhere…And I was looking at small-scale gold-mining, 
which destroys forest habitat irrevocably beyond repair. I just went to one area and it 
was like…Mordor out of Lord of the Rings. It literally is total and complete irremediable 
devastation. And this is happening all over Kalimantan and Sumatra and Papua and 
other places…” – Stakeholder of REDD+ in Indonesia 
“Working on REDD+ is like chasing clouds.” – Stakeholder of REDD+ in Indonesia 
“REDD+ is like a moving target.” – Stakeholder of REDD+ in Indonesia 
 
4.1 Introduction 
That global climate change is caused by anthropogenic carbon emissions is now 
beyond dispute (Pachauri et al. 2014). Such changes to the global climate system are 
resulting in widespread environmental and ecological changes, which in turn will have 
dire consequences for the health and livelihoods of millions of people around the world 
(IPCC 2014a). Tropical forests play a key role in both the mitigation and adaption to 
climate change and are a nexus between the global causes and local consequences of 
environmental change. Annual global deforestation and land use change from human 
activities are estimated to having contributed as much as 32 percent to anthropogenic 
emissions from the year 1750 to 2011 (Stocker et al. 2013) and are the largest sector 
contributing to global greenhouse gas emissions, after fossil fuel consumption (IPCC 
2014b). In addition, deforestation results in the loss of vital ecosystem services including 
regulating services (such as soil integrity, hydrological regulation and pollination 




which support the livelihoods, safety and food security of millions of people worldwide 
(Krieger 2001; Millenium Ecosystem Assessment 2005). ‘Forest dependence’ is a 
complicated term and it is hard to estimate just how many people are globally directly 
dependent on forests for their livelihood. According to (Chao 2012), up to 1.6 billion 
people rely on forests to some extent and 1billion rely directly on forests for their 
livelihoods.  
In an effort to reduce the amount of emissions from deforestation, the United 
Nations have proposed Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation 
(REDD), a mechanism through which forests – and carbon sequestration – become 
commodified and market based mechanisms are used with the aim to reduce carbon 
emissions (Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). REDD+ is a more recent evolution of the 
REDD program and includes other co-benefits -- considerations beyond emissions 
reduction, including: biodiversity preservation, soil conservation, water regulation, 
improved land tenure, enhanced governance and decision making, and improved 
livelihoods for forest communities (United Nations REDD Programme 2013).    
The REDD+ program is one of the largest, and arguably most complex, environmental 
management schemes in human history. Since its creation in 2005 REDD+ has been 
introduced in over 29 countries. While there have been efforts to implement REDD+  in 
many countries (Sills et al. 2014) the required methodologies, political considerations, 
funding mechanisms, and monitoring systems have yet to be fully established, leaving its 
future uncertain.  Of the many places where REDD+ is being implemented, Indonesia, provides 
an important example for understanding the potential for REDD+. Indonesia has the third largest 




2013; Margono et al. 2014).  It is one of the most biodiverse places on the planet (Convention on 
Biological Diversity 2016), and since the mid twentieth century (Barr 2001; Hansen et al. 2009) 
and continuing into recent years (Margono et al. 2014), there has been significant deforestation 
and degradation to Indonesia’s tropical forests leading to high levels of carbon emissions 
(Carlson et al. 2012; (WWF Indonesia 2008). REDD+ efforts began there in 2008 and since then, 
over 40 REDD+ demonstration activities have been initiated, though not all of these are still 
running. REDD+ plus thus presents widespread opportunities for Indonesia, to benefit financially 
from their forest reserves and prevent the environmental and social consequences of large scale 
deforestation. Despite the promises that REDD+ offers for Indonesia’s forests (Busch et al. 
2015), its implementation has been complicated as a result of the political climate in Indonesia 
(Enrici and Hubacek 2016; Galudra et al. 2011; Brockhaus et al. 2012), high demand for the 
resources within forested lands (Abood et al. 2014) , and the country’s history of questionable 
forest management practices (Transparency International 2011; Human 2013). 
REDD+ projects in Indonesia, and elsewhere, have experienced various degrees of 
success and failure. Identifying the specific challenges and opportunities that exist for REDD+ is 
necessary to inform future policy and implementation if success is to be achieved in Indonesia 
and abroad. Even though REDD+ in Indonesia began in 2007, many questions remain about how 
REDD+ will achieve what it is intended to. The aim of this research is to identify and elucidate 
challenges and opportunities for REDD+ through the perspective of people working on the 
REDD+ program in Indonesia. This paper presents the perceptions of stakeholders and 
practitioners involved in REDD+ in Indonesia at multiple scales varying from the international to 
the local. The information included here is the result of qualitative research with stakeholders of 
REDD+ working at the international, national, and local scales in Indonesia. Comparing the 
analysis of ethnographic data collection with a policy and literature review allows for an in depth 




4.2 REDD+ & Indonesia’s forests 
 REDD+ implementation in Indonesia has received much attention – the 
government of Indonesia has publicly committed to REDD+, created REDD+ agencies, 
and supported REDD+ efforts. In 2010 the government of Norway promised $1billion 
USD, signing a letter of intent with the government of Indonesia, for results based efforts 
towards deforestation reduction.  More recently, Norway has recommitted their support 
and the United Kingdom and Germany have promised more funding to Indonesia for 
successfully meeting deforestation reduction goals (Government of Norway, Government 
of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany 2015). As of yet none of the results 
based money from Norway has been released (NORAD 2016), the deforestation rate in 
Indonesia remains high (WRI GFW 2016), and based on the results of this research the 
majority of REDD+ stakeholders feel that it remains uncertain how successful REDD+ 
has been, or will be in the future. 
In 2013 Indonesia had the highest rate of deforestation on the planet (Margono et 
al. 2014) and is known for its complicated forest governance context (Contreras-
Hermosilla et al. 2005; Indrarto et al. 2012). The term governance as used in this article is 
referring to the Indonesian government agencies, including those at the national, 
provincial and local levels, and policies that create a network of control over forestry and 
other sectors. The direct drivers of deforestation in Indonesia include agriculture 
(primarily palm oil), mining, and timber harvesting– all of which frequently occur in 
highly forested areas of Indonesia (Abood et al. 2014; Kissinger, Herold, and De Sy 
2012; Indrarto et al. 2012). Since the fall of the Suharto regime, Indonesia’s government 




regional issues including forest management. District authorities have been the most 
influential, though a new regulation, “Law Number 23 about Local Government”, 
UU/23/2014, may shift that power over to provincial governments in the future.  Because 
of this decentralized system, Indonesia’s initial strategy proposed a nested framework for 
REDD+.  Much of the initial development of REDD+ occurred at the project level and as 
a result there has been a good deal of variation in the way projects have manifested. 
There are stakeholder groups in Indonesia involved in REDD+ implementation at the 
national, provincial, and local levels with a diverse range of interests in the outcome of 
the program. According to the National Strategy, groups and entities such as 
corporations, NGO’s, and communities can work within this nested framework to 
implement a REDD+ project. As a result, there are currently dozens of REDD+ 
demonstration sites where projects are underway. These demonstration sites display a 
wide variety of project structures and project goals (Global Canopy Programme 2013; 
REDD Net 2013). There is no single established source of funding for REDD+ projects – 
many report receiving funding from international aid agencies or multilateral 
development banks, some projects are working to secure funding from the carbon 
markets, and other projects are funded and facilitated by NGOs. There are projects that 
are still searching for secure, long-term funding.  
Projects can also vary in how they are implemented – some have obtained a 
license from the Indonesian Government to operate an Ecosystem Restoration 
Concession (ERC).  ERC’s are intended to allow a business entity to restore the forest 
estate in degraded areas of production forest by engaging in economic activities such as 




activities do not contribute to environmental degradation on the land. Production forest 
(hutan produksi) is designated for commercial and industrial use, and experiences high 
rates of use and deforestation (Indonesia Ministry of Forestry 2014). In the absence of an 
ERC license for the area, it is most likely that the area will be cleared, converted, or 
further degraded from its current state. While several REDD+ projects have gone the way 
of becoming an ERC, the government has been slow to grant licenses (Walsh et al 2012) 









future. Indonesia has a complex governance system of inherent tensions between 
devolution of authority to provinces and districts (desentralisasi) and an inherent 
tendency towards centralization and state control. Forest governance in Indonesia is 
particularly complex (Enrici and Hubacek 2016) and, as indicated by some of our 
respondents, requires a nuanced understanding as well as long-term perspective. 
Corruption, nepotism and patronage has been a major problem for Indonesian politics and 
governance at the local (Henderson and Kuncoro 2011; Olken 2005) and national levels 




International 2011).  Rules and regulations in Indonesia can also be complicated and 
sometimes even outright contradictory (Ewing-Chow and Losari 2015; Galudra et al. 
2011).  Land tenure and licensing have proven problematic --  there are many instances of 
overlapping and conflicting tenure (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). Governing 
authority between the national and district levels often overlaps (Steni and Hadad 2012), 
and sometimes there is a disconnect between agencies such as the Ministry of Forestry 
and district governments, both of which hold authority over forest licensing and 
enforcement. Attempts to reconcile overlapping and contradictory mandates between 
different branches and levels of government – best exemplified by the One Map Initiative 
– have stalled and Indonesia remains without a universally recognized official record of 
land tenure and forest governance (Samadhi 2013). In addition, constitutional court 
decisions given in favor of indigenous rights lobbies (Natahadibrata 2013) have further 
complicated the issue of forest governance and ownership creating a new legal tension 
between traditional customary ownership and management of forests and the state’s 
perceived monopoly over all forest lands. While these topics are more extensively 
discussed elsewhere (Enrici and Hubacek 2016; Indrarto et al. 2012; Brockhaus et al. 
2012; Djogo and Syaf 2004), this research offers an in depth look at how stakeholders 
involved directly in REDD+ experience these challenges, and can offer more insight into 
























































4.3 Methods and case study 
The REDD+ program involves collaboration among stakeholders and stakeholder 
groups operating in a number of geographical locations and at various spatial scales. 
Stakeholders for the purposes of this research are defined as people who are, or have 
extensively been, directly involved in the REDD+ program. There are stakeholder groups 
in Indonesia involved in REDD+ implementation at the international, national, and local 
levels and all have a range of interests in the outcome of the program.  To clarify the 
distinctions between these scales – the international scale involves foreign organizations 
that are operating in Indonesia, often with offices at the national scale. At the 




development banks, aid & donor agencies as well as Big International NGOs (BINGOs). 
The national scale includes Indonesian agencies that are operating from a central 
perspective. At the National level there are agencies of the Indonesian Government 
including REDD+ agencies (some of which have phased out), the Indonesian Ministries, 
policy makers, civil society organizations and others. The local level here refers to the 
district or project level. At the local level there are local NGOs, or satellite offices of the 
BINGOs, district and provincial governments, REDD+ project organizers, and 
indigenous forest communities. In some instances stakeholders might be operating at both 
the local and the national scale, traveling between locations.  
Data collection was undertaken from 2012 to 2014 in the form of participant 
observation, interviews, and a review of relevant forest policy. This ethnographic 
research was supplemented by a range of other sources including newspaper and other 
media reports, research publications, grey literature, and policy documents in order to 
understand the context of REDD+ stakeholder experiences and potential disconnects 
between the literature and what was happening on the ground. In the Indonesian context 
it can be very difficult to obtain reliable information about the realities of REDD+ and 
forestry. In particular there are often stark differences between public pronouncements, 
official documents and the reality on the ground. Thus, triangulating the data by 
including a more full spectrum of sources from international to local scales – and 
combining multiple sources, such as literature and forest policy, with interviews among 
stakeholder groups, provides insight into how international and national initiatives 
manifest themselves on the ground, increases the validity of the data (Decrop 1999) and 




This research was conducted with stakeholders from all of the above listed 
stakeholder categories and included: individuals working for foreign governments, 
employees of multi-lateral development banks, academic researchers, individuals 
working for aid & donor agencies, employees of domestic and international NGOs, as 
well as Big International NGOs (BINGOs), representatives of the Indonesian 
Government, policy makers, members of civil society organizations, district and 
provincial government officials, REDD+ project organizers, and leaders and members of 
indigenous forest communities.  Though many Indonesians are involved in REDD+ at all 
scales, many foreign individuals are also involved in REDD+, operating through research 
agencies, donor entities, foreign governments, and NGOs. The interview sample of 71 
stakeholders of REDD+ included 45 Indonesian and 26 foreign respondents.  A chain 
referral and preferential sampling method was used, and interviews were conducted with 
prominent stakeholders from all available groups with an effort to include REDD+ 
participants from a broad and representative range of stakeholder groups (Bernard 2006; 
Charmaz and Belgrave 2002).  
Interviews in Indonesia were conducted in English and Bahasa Indonesia, the 
official language of Indonesia and most commonly spoken dialect of the archipelago, or 
with the assistance of a local translator. Data collection took place in Jakarta and Bogor, 
as well as in a variety of locations in provinces and districts where REDD+ is being 
implemented. A small number of interviews were also conducted in Washington, DC 
where some REDD+ stakeholder groups have headquarters. Informal semi-structured 
interviews with informants from key stakeholder groups were one of the primary tools for 




this that include a wide variety of respondents representing different viewpoints because 
they allow the researcher to have some uniformity among interviews for comparison 
while also providing room for exploring important topics more in depth (Bernard 2006). 
See Appendix A for the interview guideline. The interviews consisted of approximately 
five to seven standardized questions developed based on relevant literature and 
preliminary scoping fieldwork. This initial set of questions was followed by additional 
questioning to further explore topics brought up during each interview. Interviews began 
with broad questions aimed at getting a general understanding of respondent’s 
experiences with REDD+, and when topics relating to challenges, successes, or 
perceptions of REDD+ were mentioned those were explored in more depth.  18 meetings 
were attended in total, and include nine at the national or provincial levels relevant to 
REDD+ policy and strategy as well as nine local meetings relevant to REDD+ 
implementation and stakeholder engagement. Those meetings selected for inclusion in 
the study included any meeting that was directly or indirectly related to REDD+ 
implementation at any scale, and that was open to the public, or to which an invitation 
was extended. Information about national scale meetings was obtained through contacts 
in the Indonesian government, or other foreign governments, as well as through the 
Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR) whose headquarters is in Bogor, 
Indonesia. Information about local scale meetings was obtained through NGOs, project 
organizers, local communities, and local governments. At these meetings special 
attention was paid when stakeholders mentioned successes, opportunities, challenges, and 
perceptions of REDD+.   




in the case of the few exceptions meticulous notes were taken of the interview. Grounded 
theory and inductive methods were used for data analysis. Using grounded theory and 
inductive methods means using a bottom up, rather than a top down, approach for 
forming frameworks and research conclusions (Charmaz 2011; Corbin and Strauss 2007). 
Interviews were transcribed and entered into a TAMS Analyzer database in order to 
apply this grounded theory approach to analyzing the data (Charmaz and Belgrave 2002; 
Charmaz 2006). Following an inductive coding method (Corbin and Strauss 2007)  
interview transcripts, and meeting notes and transcripts, were reviewed at various stages 
of data collection to develop a list of coding categories based on recurring themes and 
issues mentioned by respondents. All interview transcripts were coded using these 
categories. The themes that emerged from the interviews were used in conjunction with 
literature and policy review to identify the major challenges and opportunities as 
discussed in the following sections.     
4.4 Results 
4.4.1 Lack of Pathways for Implementation 
One of the main themes presented by stakeholders was that there was a lack of 
pathways for implementation of REDD+ projects. This could be categorized into several 
more specific manifestations -- (1) Corruption is still a major problem and can result in 
an inability to enforce project boundaries  (2) Complicated and often confusing 
governance, regulations and policy create difficulties for project implementation. (3) 
Securing sufficient funding is a major challenge for many stakeholders. All of these 
challenges can compound and create a situation in which it is often difficult for project 




difficult to obtain, stakeholders report that it becomes harder to secure funding. And 
without sufficient funding, it can be a challenge for projects to secure successful 
outcomes.  Stakeholders also expressed that policy and regulations in Indonesia can often 
be complicated and outright confusing, a characteristic of Indonesian forest governance 
that has been well documented ( Bell 2010; Bakker and Moniaga 2010; Indrarto et al. 
2012). Confusing regulations coupled with overlapping authority between national and 
regional governments, another characteristic of Indonesian forest governance ( Barr et al. 
2006), was reported as a deterrent for some stakeholders or organizations working 
towards establishing REDD+ projects. Corruption, a well-known and pervasive problem 
throughout Indonesia (Schütte 2012) and particularly the forestry sector (Dermawan et al. 
2011; Transparency International 2011), also continues to be a major challenge for 
REDD+ project organizers. Each of these topics are discussed in further detail in the 
following sections.  
4.4.1.1 Corruption and inability to enforce project boundaries  
 Corruption is broadly defined as the abuse of entrusted power by political leaders 
for private gain. Indonesia’s former leader, Suharto, is thought to have been one of the 
most corrupt leader of all time (Transparency InternationaI 2004). The legacy of this 
corruption continued after the fall of Suharto as Indonesia decentralized, and to the 
present day (Olken 2005; Duncan 2007). Concerns about corruption and how it is 
impacting REDD+ projects were expressed by both foreign and Indonesian stakeholders 
operating at all scales of REDD+ implementation, and have also been documented in the 
literature (Dermawan et al. 2011). At one time the Ministry of Forestry was found to be 




Indonesian Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) and was furthermore found 
responsible for inaccurately mapping forest cover, land use, concessions and unfairly 
allocating land rights (HRW 2013). While such high level corruption is problematic for 
forest management, corruption in the forestry sector also occurs at the local level 
(Prasetyia 2012; Kuncoro et al. 2013) and can be problematic for REDD+ projects.   
 Stakeholders from this research operating at all scales reported frustration with 
corruption in Indonesia. Concerns from stakeholders operating at the national or 
international levels expressed a sense of mistrust and concern for how corruption seems 
to be affecting forest management and facilitating high levels of deforestation. 
Stakeholders working at the local level reported more specific concerns about corruption 
resulting from hands on experiences with corruption that hindered progress on projects. 
Specific examples include different types of interactions with local authorities -- often 
stakeholders working at the local or project level reported instances where authorities 
expect bribes or payments in order to enforce project boundaries and stop encroachment. 
While some projects seem to have enjoyed the support of local officials, other 
stakeholders reported that at the district level they often cannot get approval for projects, 
even after a project has been approved by the central government. A number of 
stakeholders reported a lack of enforcement of current regulations, which can also lead to 
a sense of general frustration and fatigue with REDD+. One informant who works at both 
the international and project level, referring to a visit to one of the provinces where 
REDD+ is being implemented, put it like this: “It was really staggering, the amount of, 
the complete lack of enforcement of any rules or regulations about destruction of [the 




In addition to the frustration and doubt that corruption causes stakeholders, 
corruption has been reported in the literature (Galinato and Galinato 2013; Galinato and 
Galinato 2012) to lead to higher rates of deforestation in general, and based on the results 
of this research facilitated encroachment into protected areas. This is something that is 
evidenced by the same phenomena occurring across protected forest areas in Indonesia 
(Gaveau et al. 2013; Margono et al. 2012; Broich et al. 2011; Indonesia Ministry of 
Forestry 2014).  Corruption as is being seen by many working on REDD+ in Indonesia 
interferes with stakeholders having sufficient authority and the ability to enforce project 
boundaries. Without proper governance over the REDD+ project territories, it makes it 
difficult to achieve goals for carbon sequestration and biodiversity preservation. Other 
stakeholders also reported that local authorities failed to respond to encroachment within 
project boundaries, widely reported as a problem in Indonesia’s protected forest areas 
(Murdiyarso et al. 2011; Gaveau et al. 2013; Sloan et al. 2012). For some stakeholders, 
the idea of having to pay bribes in order to get local support was both expected and 
necessary. As one stakeholder working at the local level put it, “…to make it work we 
have to make tribute payments to the local authorities…we’ve got to find ways to get 
support from the local authorities.”- Respondent ID10387.  Some stakeholders, who may 
even have some level of support from local officials, report running into problems with 
specific local officials. One expressed the difficulties they had experienced while 
working at the local level, in multiple districts across Indonesia, like this, “[He] 
manipulates everything…once when we tried to arrange a meeting with different local 
[departments] he arranged it so that it was only his close friends that came to the 




Others expressed concern about how local law enforcement failed to protect their rights. 
Sometimes local police and authorities are even allegedly involved in the encroachment 
activities. One stakeholder, a project organizer whose project faces agricultural 
encroachment, illegal logging, and intentionally set fires said this, “The police won’t do 
anything, really they should be trying to enforce themselves…there was a road built 
through our concession two years ago, after our concession was approved, and it [gives 
access for] illegal logging. [The local authority] tells people he owns the place, and they 
pay him to work here. Now those illegal loggers want [us] to pay them to go elsewhere. 
His son is a policeman here. They know that it’s supposed to be our concession…If we 
want to stop them, where can we go?” Respondent ID 10390.  
Sometime encroachment is done by other entities, such as agricultural companies 
or smallholders, but without local governmental support there is very little that project 
organizers, or even local communities within those projects, can do about it. In other 
scenarios, sometimes outside entities encourage encroachment by local villagers, which 
can make it more difficult for project organizers to stop the encroachment – without local 
government support it is nearly impossible. One stakeholder said this, “We have villagers 
planting palm oil inside our concession. The [palm oil company] pays them to plant it 
there.” – Respondent ID 10383. Another project described smallholder palm oil within 
their REDD+ project that was increasing at an alarming rate, when the smallholders were 
confronted they claimed to have been sold permits for their plots of land from someone 
on another of Indonesia’s islands. Project organizers turned to local authorities for 
support, but were expected to make payments, which their international-aid-agency-




involved in a REDD+ project and working at the local level said this, “Illegal oil palm 
from [our REDD site] is sold to agents or a local mill, owned by the government of 
Indonesia.“ -- Respondent ID 10422. Many respondents expressed this kind of frustration 
at how little support they felt from the Indonesian authorities often because of 
connections between corrupt activities and different levels of government in Indonesia.  
Stakeholders experiences with corruption can make REDD+ project management 
challenging, as the extensive encroachment associated with it leads to forest cover and 
biodiversity loss.  Corruption such as mentioned by our respondents can also lead to 
stakeholder fatigue and doubt, discussed further in section 4.3. 
4.4.1.2 Complex and confusing regulations  
Indonesian governance is known for being complex and characterized by sometimes 
confusing laws (G. F. Bell 2003; Bakker and Moniaga 2010), which extends to governance in the 
forestry sector (Indrarto et al. 2012; Galudra et al. 2011). Sometimes laws overlap, or contradict 
themselves (Beckert et al. 2014; McCarthy and Moeliono 2012), leading to a challenging context 
for REDD+ projects. Stakeholders working from within Indonesian institutions as well as foreign 
stakeholders expressed frustration with the complex situation surrounding forest governance.  
One informant working at the national level described it like this, “It’s an interesting sector to be 
in. I think you could spend 10 years here and still not understand. And again, a lot of very 
experienced colleagues, who’ve worked all over the world, have said to me that they’ve never 
worked in a more complicated system than here.” –Respondent ID 10369. Another foreign 
stakeholder, working at the national level expressed it like this, “It just makes it really, really 
hard…just the whole regulatory process. When the Ministry of Forestry is in the process of 




embarrassing, so then they leave it there.  And if they want to come and regulate the topic, the 
same topic, or revise it…they really want to avoid retracting it, they just want to retract some 
pieces of it, and they'll add some pieces of it. So at some point, they had three non-aligned, 
sometimes contradictory regulations on REDD and they were in the process of developing a 4th 
one…so then they try to start over and try and fit it together, and you wind up with this 
impossible framework.” – Respondent ID 10371 
Ultimately, these challenges may mean that some stakeholders from foreign agencies are 
unable or unwilling to continue efforts to support REDD+ and other similar projects in 
Indonesia. Many foreign stakeholders operating at the national or international level felt that they 
were unable to find pathways to move forward with projects in REDD+ as well as other aspects 
of the forestry sector, which in some cases lead to their withdrawal from the country or on 
REDD+ projects. One stakeholder we interviewed reported this kind of situation with a partner 
organization ,“…I was working with someone from [an international] Development Agency, and 
she was in Indonesia specifically for the purpose of closing down all of [their country’s] 
development activities in Indonesia. They are completely pulling out because they find it too 
difficult to work here and have any positive effect, and they think their dollars are much better 
used [elsewhere]. So they’re taking all their money…and they’re completely pulling out.”—
Respondent ID 10377. While the complicated forestry context creates a challenge for actual 
implementation of forest conservation projects, it can also provide a daunting environment for 
stakeholder groups establishing and maintaining long term working relationships in the country. 
Furthermore, without sufficient understanding of the context in Indonesia, some foreign 
stakeholders may not be able or willing to persevere with projects  -- another informant put it 




[to do] research on forestry licenses, you can’t quite [go by] what’s written down. You’ve got to 
meet the right people and do the kind of social appraisal of asking something and then asking 
them to introduce you to other people and then try and collate your information and get back to 
the truth. So it’s a completely labor intensive process. I think there’s a lot of donors that just 
won’t have time or resources to do that. They don’t want to have relationships that intensive.” – 
Respondent ID 10376. 
Stakeholders working within Indonesian institutions also expressed frustration 
with the overlapping governance and regulations. Governance in Indonesia often overlaps 
between different scales, particularly in a conflict of interest and control between the 
national government and the local governments (Stevens et al. 2014; Brockhaus et al. 
2012). One stakeholder put it like this, “Now there are too many regulations, too many 
institutions that are managing REDD+.“-- Respondent ID 10395.  Throughout Indonesia 
overlapping authority among different agencies, or various scales of government, can 
also contribute to confusion and challenges for those working in the forestry sector 
(Indrarto et al. 2012; Bakker and Moniaga 2010; Resosudarmo 2004). Overlapping 
authority presents a challenge for forest governance in Indonesia, and this can create 
doubt and confusion among those involved in REDD+, something that was expressed by 
foreign and Indonesian informants alike. As one stakeholder put it, “Coming in the 
Ministry of Forestry was the leader on REDD in Indonesia…but the problem is that it's 
hard to get [the Indonesian Government] to think about it differently…and then you'd be 
at the district level and they'd be like, 'We can't possibly be interested or responsible for 
everything within the district boundaries because the Ministry of Forestry controls all of 




talk to the Ministry of Forestry and look at the regulations, it actually largely is under the 
district's control. So those gray areas that people talk about today…that's how you know 
where you have a huge number of problems.” -- Respondent ID 10380. 
The quote above also highlights a disconnect between what happens at the 
national level and the local level in Indonesia, something that is acknowledged by 
Indonesian and foreign stakeholders at both local and national levels. At one meeting 
among Indonesian government officials and foreign researchers, an Indonesian 
representative said this, “The state wants to implement [this], but the district doesn't have 
the same awareness level"—Respondent ID 10402. Another Indonesian stakeholder based 
at the national level said this, “And as you probably know already, in Indonesia it's the 
Bupati [district government head] that basically make the decisions about land 
allocation. So they have a very important role in deforestation, they give the license.” --
Respondent ID 10404. Sometimes those locally issued licenses contradict official land 
use categories designated by the Ministry of Environment and Forestry at the national 
level ( Barr et al. 2006; Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). A recent law, ‘‘Law Number 
23 about Local Government,’’ UU/23/2014, intended to rectify some of the problems that 
come about as a result of extreme decentralization (Prasetyia 2012; Ewing-Chow and 
Losari 2015) attempts to shift authority from the districts to the provinces. While 
Indonesia has over 500 districts, it only has 34 provinces, so the new law has the potential 
to strengthen the connection between central and regional governments by shifting power 
from many district governments to provincial governments. However, this shift has not 
yet materialized.  




problematic in the way it manifests with licensing and tenure in Indonesia, as parcels of 
land may have conflicting licenses for different uses (Resosudarmo et al, 2011; 
Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 2005). Licenses are sometimes issued by local authorities, 
and may conflict with forest designation by the central government (Barr et al. 2006). 
Permits can also overlap with each other, after having been issued by either local or 
national level authorities (Steni and Hadad 2012).  This can pose a problem when there is 
confusion or conflict over tenure in REDD+ project areas, or in areas that are designated 
as protected forest by the Indonesian government. Some members of forest communities 
involved in our fieldwork were not aware that there were palm oil concessions 
overlapping with their customary forest (hutan adat).  Many community customary 
forests in Indonesia are vulnerable because of the challenges associated with establishing 
community forest rights. Despite a 2012 court ruling that for the first time established the 
right of communities to have tenure rights to their customary forests (Natahadibrata 
2013), very few of claims of community forest rights have been established since then. 
Stakeholders from our research involved in such cases report the process to be long and 
arduous, with challenges arising from the complicated legal system in Indonesia and 
conflicting governance among national and local levels something also supported in the 
literature (Sahide et al. 2016).  
The introduction of REDD+ and the attention it has brought to the forestry sector 
in Indonesia has increased awareness of some of these issues – in particular the fact that 
there is no single authority or database for land-use permits and different sectors have 
different maps (Sills et al. 2014). As a result, one solution was proposed in which a single 




overlapping tenure throughout the country. However this project, called “One Map”, has 
not yet been completed, potentially as a result of the enormity of the task. One 
stakeholder who had been involved in development of the One Map project said this, “We 
are engaging into an MoU with the governor of [the province]…so the governor 
requested the companies there provide them with all of the licensing data, with all of the 
administration data, and also the data they already have for licenses. We gathered all of 
them…it was [very much] a lot because we received like ten boxes of documents each 
day, and it keeps on going and going and going. And that’s only from [three districts], 
not the whole [province]” Respondent ID 10394. Indonesia has over 500 districts, which 
in consideration of the overwhelming documentation described here may partially explain 
why the One Map project has not yet materialized. The stakeholder then goes on to 
describe the problems with the documentation, which are indicative of the well 
documented tenure issues that exist throughout Indonesia (Contreras-Hermosilla et al. 
2005; Sunderlin et al. 2014; Barkmann et al. 2010),  …there are some licenses that are 
not there. It’s a really huge problem. We’ve asked the government, but they said that they 
don’t have them but then they will [speak to] the company. But the company said they 
don’t have them.” Respondent ID 10394.  Despite his role with the central Indonesian 
government, there does not seem to be an explanation for exactly where this problem 
arises, “…I don’t know where is the problem. But as for me, I think the problem is [with] 
the government because, well, they issued licenses, they should have the documentations. 
So I don’t know what happened. I think, well, perhaps there are some errors or they just 
don’t remember to keep the data or maybe the data [doesn’t] really exist. If that 




scenario, while described by someone working for the central government, is indicative 
of what was reported by many stakeholders at both the national and local levels from 
both Indonesian and foreign agencies. Confusion and a lack of transparency, as seen in 
the example described above, are linked to higher levels of corruption (Kolstad and Wiig 
2009). Complex and confusing governance thus not only frustrates efforts to implement 
REDD+ in Indonesia, but directly fuels the corruption, nepotism and collusions that are 
systemic amongst Indonesia’s forest governance system.  
Setting up a REDD+ project as an Ecosystem Restoration Concession may come 
with further complications. Stakeholders who have approached REDD+ as an ERC, have 
described difficulty in navigating the process of obtaining a license, and by March of 
2012, 44 applications for ERC’s had been received though only 3 had been approved 
(Walsh et al. 2012). One stakeholder involved at the project level described their 
experience working with the central Indonesian government as having included 
unwarranted bias from a government official that was against their project, “At one point 
an individual in the government was against us, we kept getting money from 
investors...but then we couldn't get more because we never had any progress to show, 
there was no good news.”—Respondent ID 10382.  Some already established ERC based 
REDD+ projects have reported that the process for obtaining an ERC as long and 
daunting. Rimba Makmur, a large project in Central Kalimantan reports registering for an 
ERC license in November 2008 and finally receiving it in December 2013. Their ERC 
license was finally granted after international attention was drawn to the projects’ 
challenges when in November 2013 Harrison Ford visited the project to shoot his 




ERC concession only covered half of the requested area (Indriatmoko, Atmadja, Utomo, 
et al. 2014). Rimba Raya, another project in Central Kalimantan also reports that the 
licensing process took 4 years, from 2009 to 2013, and in the end they were also only 
granted a partial license (Indriatmoko, Atmadja, Ekaputri, et al. 2014). As obtaining an 
ERC license will be essential for the development of many REDD+ projects, the 
difficulty in obtaining a license has the potential to greatly affect the overall progress of 
REDD+ in Indonesia.   
4.4.1.3 Issues with funding 
Difficulty finding sufficient funding was frequently reported as a major challenge 
towards project implementation.  While the lack of funding is something that has been 
discussed in the literature (Phelps, Webb, and Koh 2011; Dixon and Challies 2015), some 
international and national level stakeholders seem unaware of the challenges that come 
with REDD+ funding. Part of the reason it is so important to discuss the financing 
options for REDD+ is because of the contrast between the perception of massive funding 
but a shortage of available finance on the ground. The experiences reported by many 
respondents from this research suggest that this knowledge about lack of funding is 
prevalent among many stakeholders working on REDD+ at the project or local level, and 
it undermines their confidence and investment in the program. 
While no official statements have yet been issued by the government of 
Indonesia, the government of Norway reports that approximately 8% of the 1billionUSD 
that were promised to Indonesia have either been released or “committed’ (Royal 
Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta 2016). Though it is not clear where exactly these funds 




channels -- bilateral cooperation, dedicated NGOs grants (NORAD 2016), and global 
initiatives (via multilateral agencies) (Personal communications with Norwegian 
Indonesian Embassy July 17, 2016).  At the Conference of Parties 21 (COP 21) in 2015 
the Governments of Germany, the United Kingdom, and Norway all promised “an aim to 
provide $1 billion per year by 2020, or to provide over $5 billion in the period 2015-
2020, including a significant increase in pay for performance finance if countries 
demonstrate measured, reported and verified emission reductions“ (Government of 
Norway, Government of the United Kingdom, and Government of Germany 2015). The 
Government of Norway has also stated that at least 80% of their initially promised 
$1bllion USD is being reserved for performance based results, none of which has yet 
been dispersed (Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta 2016). Thus, despite widely 
reported, substantial funding for REDD+, many projects are lacking basic funds to 
support on-the-ground projects.  
Many projects were initiated with the assumption that these funds, or the carbon 
markets would be easily accessible for project financing, yet that has not been the case 
for many REDD+ stakeholders. It may even be possible that the perceived projections of 
all this available funding has actually undermined REDD+ effectiveness by overselling 
the idea of available funding and encouraging some projects to be initiated without a 
solid plan for obtaining financing.  For example, the UN Pilot Project in Sulawesi 
reported that lack of funding was one of the reasons the project failed after several years 
of preparatory activities (United Nations REDD Programme 2013). As one stakeholder 
put it, “We must meet all the government requirements, but it’s very expensive. We can't 




10420. Another stakeholder put it like this, ”[REDD+] is not working here because 
people expect lots of money and when it runs out they leave.”-- Respondent ID 10423. 
Another put it like this, “There’s no money coming through to anyone. It was kind of the 
general complaint, it was like, great, we have all these meetings, but we’re trying to make 
a living out here.” Respondent ID 10386. So despite the great hope that promised funds 
have brought, funding has remained out of the grasp of many REDD+ stakeholders and 
projects. 
From its inception, REDD+ has been envisioned as a market based mechanism 
(Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). Though early pilot projects and readiness efforts 
have largely been funded by donor grants (Streck 2012), the intention was that a carbon 
trading mechanism would sustain the long-term viability of projects and incentivize 
expansion. Despite these intentions, stakeholders from this research reported that the 
carbon market did not provide a viable funding option in many cases. Carbon markets, as 
explained by (Kollmuss et al 2008) function as such: The intention of carbon offsetting 
through carbon markets is to have high carbon emitters mitigate or offset their emissions 
by purchasing or supporting emissions reductions elsewhere.  Carbon markets exist as 
both compliance and voluntary markets. In the compliance markets countries and 
companies must offset a pre-set amount of their carbon emissions through trading or 
purchasing of carbon credits. The amounts for emissions and credits are determined by 
institutions such as the European Union’s Emissions Trading Scheme and regimes like 
the Kyoto Protocol. Voluntary markets function separately from compliance markets, and 
allow companies or individuals to voluntarily purchase carbon credits to offset their 




Because of concerns about their ability to actually reduce emissions, many forest 
conservation activities including REDD+ have been excluded from some carbon market 
mechanisms including the compliance market (Carbon Market Watch 2016; Butler, Koh, 
and Ghazoul 2009). At Conference of the Parties 2015 (COP21) it was acknowledged 
that carbon markets are not sufficiently developed in order to support climate change 
mitigation efforts (Johannsdottir and McInerney 2016).  As a result, many REDD+ 
stakeholders, – working on projects not already funded by aid agencies or NGOs – find 
that selling carbon emissions provides insufficient funds.  One project organizer said that, 
“One of toughest things is carbon credits, the market is still soft. We could have 2 million 
a year in carbon credits, [but we] can't sell them all.”--Respondent ID 10384. Another 
foreign respondent involved at the national level put it like this, “ Over the last year, it’s 
really gotten questionable. I mean I’ve started asking some of the [big NGOs] what their 
policy is if nobody is buying these credits. Well, we haven’t really figured that out yet. So 
in a way, it’s a real tragedy because there’s a lot of people out there that have invested a 
lot of time and effort and money into producing REDD credits, and now the worry is 
nobody will buy [them]. Of course, there is still a voluntary market…but there’s not the 
huge increase in demand that everybody anticipated.” Respondent ID 10366. 
Some working at the local level felt that they just would not be able to get 
sufficient funding to maintain their project over the long term. One such individual 
operating at the local level said, “We need more support, [people are] always thinking 
about the money. We need more cash from outside, from donors. There's not enough 
money to scale up.”-- Respondent ID 10392.  This may speak to the fact that the financial 




uses, such as palm oil (Butler et al 2009). Stakeholders are aware how this imbalance of 
economic incentives may impact REDD+, and it can also create doubts for long-term 
success. One stakeholder said this, “The other issue is that REDD money is not unlimited.  
It's going to be a drop in the bucket compared to the revenue that palm oil, for example, 
brings in or pulp and paper. So how do you address the real drivers of deforestation? 
Like, how do you really do that?  And how can you use REDD to really do that?  I don't 
know.”-Respondent ID 10379.   
The inability of REDD+ to compete with activities such as mining and palm oil 
agriculture may continue to be problematic in the future for a number of reasons. For 
example, globally REDD+ has created new opportunities for securing local tenure rights 
(Larson et al. 2013). However, while securing community rights can lead to more 
successful forest management in some situations (Stevens et al. 2014), it may not in cases 
where other activities can offer communities more financial compensation for their 
community forest (Resosudarmo et al. 2014). The lack of sufficient funding can also 
impact stakeholder perceptions of REDD+ and belief in the possibilities for achieving 
successful outcomes, “One of our economists went to Kalimantan last week for a trip, 
and he saw the scale of the coal mining and the scale of the money that is coming in 
formally and informally to the local district government. And his feedback to me was 
REDD’s got a tough job to do here if it can even try and compete with the level of money 
that’s flowing in. And he became a skeptic overnight.” -- Respondent ID 10377. These 
kinds of negative statements were prevalent among stakeholders from all scales and 




4.4.2 Clashing perspectives 
Stakeholders reported varying perspectives about what exactly REDD+ is, how it 
should look, and be implemented. The diverse range of perspectives amongst 
stakeholders as to the purpose and mechanism of REDD+ has the potential to both 
facilitate and hinder efforts towards project success. On the one hand, as a possible 
strength of the program, it may allow for a diverse range of REDD+ projects to adopt to 
the complexity of Indonesia’s regulatory system and forest context, leading to creative 
and innovative solutions appropriate for the local context. The lack of consensus could 
also result in substantial disparities between successful projects and less successful 
projects. Different perspectives can be related to varying aspects of REDD+: how 
successful stakeholders perceive projects to be; what major challenges are; and what the 
purpose or goals for a REDD+ demonstration activity might be. While some see REDD+ 
as a way to commodify forests, others see it as a way to achieve conservation objectives, 
and yet others still see it as a way to strengthen forest community rights. These varying 
perspectives may offer an opportunity for projects to develop that are able to successfully 
achieve outcomes within the complex Indonesian system. However, the variation 
between stakeholder perspectives could also exacerbate the disconnect that already exists 
in Indonesia between governance at the national and local scales. 
A substantial disconnect exists between global policy and rhetoric, the central 
government and efforts at the local level. Despite a discourse of community-led, 
collaboratively managed projects, this reality has yet to manifest itself on the ground. 
Much REDD+ discourse – despite public consultations –is top–down and information 




transnational actors (Moeliono et al. 2014). One striking example of this from our 
fieldwork arose when stakeholders operating at the national level had perceptions about 
availability of funding that significantly differed from what stakeholders working at the 
project level experienced. One stakeholder working at the international scale and 
representing a foreign donor government said, “So certainly, I think funding is not going 
to be the constraint, I think the constraint is going to be to identify good, strategic, 
important projects.”—Respondent ID10373. As mentioned in the section above, this 
perspective differs greatly from the perspective of stakeholders on the ground. At the 
project level, stakeholder repeatedly noted the lack of funds. As one stakeholder involved 
at the project level said, “…it’s hard to find funding.”—Respondent ID 10389.  And 
another put it like this, “And it's totally unclear what the finance is going to be.”—
Respondent ID 10378. When stakeholders working at the national and international level 
are not in touch with the real challenges for those working on REDD+ projects at the 
local level it may contribute to logistical problems for project implementation. 
The differences in perspectives among stakeholders is not always problematic and 
can also mean that those involved in developing projects see REDD+ as an opportunity to 
achieve different, but related, goals—all of which may fall under the umbrella of 
REDD+. Today, many stakeholders seem to see REDD+ as a means of achieving certain 
goals – making money, conserving forest ecosystems, and strengthening community 
rights. When REDD+ was initially conceived of by the U.N., the primary goal was to 
make forests more valuable in our global economic system so that they could be 
conserved and treated as a commodity through valuation of the carbon they stored, thus 




(Holloway and Giandomenico 2009). Some stakeholders still seem to view REDD+ in 
this way, “But in the ideal, to tie [our project] into the whole REDD idea, [our project] 
is trying to conserve forests…which will keep the carbon in the forest…and contribute to 
mitigating climate change.”—Respondent ID10403. Similarly, others may see REDD+ as 
a way to commodify forests and make a profit while achieving other REDD+ goals, 
essentially running the project as a business “You need to treat it like a business. Figure 
out the end goal and carbon-credit sales first, then all the costs and fieldwork. [We] did 
the license and business planning first, including marketing, lots of marketing. For a 
business you have to spend money on that.”-- Respondent ID 10382.   
After its initial conception, it was acknowledged that there were other 
considerations, or co-benefits, such as strengthening forest community rights and 
biodiversity conservation that needed to be included in REDD+ (Holloway and 
Giandomenico 2009). Different actors have leveraged these components of REDD+ 
towards their area of interest – whether carbon sequestration, biodiversity conservation or 
community rights.  Many NGOs and civil society organizations have seen REDD+ as an 
opportunity to achieve long held goals for conservation and capacity building among 
indigenous forest communities.  As such, REDD+ is often viewed merely as a vehicle 
through which other objectives can be funded and implemented. While, such activities 
may align with broad objective of REDD+, there is little-to-no adoption by many 
REDD+ project organizers of the central mission of REDD+ as envisioned in 
international policy. Many NGO and civil society organizations expressed their view of 
REDD+ as a way to achieve goals for strengthening forest community rights and 




do the right [thing] first, REDD+ later. We don’t really think about REDD, actually. But 
since REDD is related to forest, then what we do is [figure out] how to protect the forest 
first and the rights of the indigenous peoples who own the forest.”—Respondent ID 
10399, others described the purpose of REDD+ as being to preserve ecosystem services 
provided by forests and to change the current paradigm surrounding forest land use, “I 
think the aim of REDD, of course it is to reduce the deforestation and change the 
paradigm here…We recognize the very important ecological functions of forests when 
they are conserved as they are, [rather] than when we cut [them].”—Respondent ID 
10401. These different perspectives can offer those undertaking REDD+ activities 
different avenues for creating REDD+ projects, and can be seen in the different ways that 
projects have developed in Indonesia. This kind of variation among projects allows 
stakeholders to navigate the challenging complexities of forest governance and land 
tenure in Indonesia. 
 4.4.3 Cultural barriers: Insufficient open discussion about problems with REDD+ 
and forest management in general 
Many stakeholders expressed a feeling that there was a lack of openness and 
clarity in REDD+ interactions in Indonesia. Collaboration among stakeholder groups has 
been identified as an important component of long-term successful ecosystem and natural 
resource management schemes (Vacik et al. 2014; Blumenthal and Jannink 2016). While 
the inclusion and collaboration of stakeholders at multiple scales has been acknowledged 
in many REDD+ documents (Climate Investment Funds 2013; UN REDD Programme 





Indonesia has a complex and rich cultural context, reflected by the fact that over 
700 languages are spoken there. While this cultural diversity has made Indonesia the 
diverse place that it is, it has also created a complicated context which some describe as 
chaotic (Parry 2007; Forrester 1999). This complexity means that sometimes foreign 
organizations and stakeholders working in Indonesia may find the Indonesian system 
difficult to navigate when working towards achieving goals for large scale projects, such 
as REDD+. Because of the diversity of cultures in Indonesia, even some Indonesian 
respondents from our research report finding the complexity of Indonesia difficult to 
navigate. Many foreign and Indonesian stakeholders reported feelings of frustration and 
sometimes even confusion when working on REDD+ efforts, particularly at the national 
or international level.   
Many stakeholders seemed aware of how the complexity of the Indonesian 
context was impacting outcomes for REDD+. One stakeholder, described frustrations in 
regards to weak governance and the lack of reference levels, data on baseline forest cover 
in many areas, “REDD cannot work here, we don't have the reference levels. And 
Indonesia is too diverse and vast. The national government cannot control the 
subnational, provincial or kabupaten [district].”—Respondent ID 10367. Confusion can 
happen when well-meaning foreign donors or project organizers approach the situation 
with less knowledge about cultural context than may be necessary.  As one stakeholder 
put it, “You wind up with all these really strange situations where donors come in, and 
they talk to some government person who, you know, may or may not understand what 
they're saying; may or may not really be an appropriate decision maker for the topic, and 




felt that it was difficult to navigate the cultural context of Indonesia in a way that would 
allow them to be successful over the long term, “Operating here as a civil society body is 
difficult, and the government has been known to kick out quite a lot of civil society 
[organizations] that they don’t agree with…I think you have to be brave to work here, 
and to set up a business is almost impossible.”—Respondent ID 10368. 
 Other stakeholders felt that when there were issues that arose, it was difficult to 
address them directly and were unsure how to deal with problems in a culturally 
appropriate way. Some who had been working in the country for a long time had a better 
sense of how to approach issues, and one respondent working at the international level 
based in Jakarta put it like this, “It’s difficult because you can never say anything 
directly…You never look somebody in the eye and say ‘You’re wrong.’ You say,’Perhaps 
we could all sit down with the numbers, and we’ll walk through how we did our 
calculation, and you can walk through how you did yours. We’ll see where we start to 
diverge and then we can talk about it.’ And that’s the only way we can do it. You have to 
get people they respect [in the discussions] because…if they don’t like the result, they 
just refuse to accept the facts. It’s just science…it’s like the temperature. The 
thermometer says it’s 70, you can’t say, ‘No, that’s wrong. It’s 40.’ It’s not 
subjective…[but], you’re going to see that kind of reaction”- Respondent ID 10381.  And 
another working at the national level, emphasizing the frustration felt as a result of the 
disconnect, said this about overcoming challenges for REDD+, “Yeah, this is quite an 
interesting one, especially because of the forest sector and the Ministry of Forestry's 
definition of degradation and deforestation differing from the rest of the universe 




everyone else is saying the opposite. And it's the same data, it's the definitions and what 
they're calling deforestation. So, getting those definitions in place like we agreed to is 
going to be a bit of a challenge, I think.”—Respondent ID 10370.  Comments such as 
these were common among respondents, and are also connected to lack of buy-in and 
stakeholder fatigue – both are discussed in more detail in the following two sections. 
4.4.4 Stakeholder fatigue -- stakeholders doubt the possibility for the success of 
REDD+ in the future 
 The sentiments of doubt, stakeholder fatigue, and lack of buy in presented in this 
and the following section are representative of the feelings of the majority of our 
respondents. Stakeholders from all the various groups and scales expressed some doubt 
and disenchantment with REDD+, and these were some of the most emphasized and 
salient themes presented by respondents. Disappointment with the achievements of 
REDD+ were recently expressed publicly by government officials from Norway (Parlina 
and Nicholas 2016). At the national level this stakeholder fatigue is often expressed as a 
doubt REDD+ would endure and be able to achieve success in the long run. This is how 
it was expressed by one informant, “There are so many problems that we are dealing 
with to overcome these REDD+ issues like local conflicts, either vertical conflict or 
horizontal conflict, or law enforcement, the corruption, the licensing, there’s [so 
much].”—Respondent ID 10396.  While many of these feelings about REDD+ were often 
specific to the Indonesian context, but also extended to the global perspective, “So I 
would say that my general perspective on this is all incredibly difficult work. So to not 
have made the progress that anyone hopes, or even 10%, is not surprising. And so, when 




is....it's certainly an issue globally too.”—Respondent ID 10374. And also that globally 
successful forest management is a major challenge, but particularly so in the Indonesian 
context, “It's been really painful to watch actually, I feel really bad for [the Indonesian 
government]. You know, people underestimate how hard it is to do certain things well. 
And like with the US, has the US cracked any of this? Is our forest cover monitoring 
system good? No. Is our alignment of institutions that control forests good? No. Can we 
actually make a commitment to reduce forest loss? No. So the idea that Indonesia should 
be able to do any of those things, it's a little bit disingenuous.  It's a ridiculously hard 
problem. Especially in a country like Indonesia, where it's so resource dependent and 
corrupt.” Respondent ID 10411. 
 At the community level stakeholder fatigue manifests as doubts that promises 
would be met. Free Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) was developed as a way to make 
sure that communities were fairly and ethically being involved in the process (Colchester 
2010). In some cases well-meaning stakeholders, some of whom may have been doing 
their best to offer communities FPIC, may have approached communities years ago. 
However, when licenses take many years to obtain, or financing turned out to be difficult 
to find, communities feel they have been made false promises and lose faith in the 
stakeholders that have approached them and in the associated processes, including 
REDD+. 
  Some stakeholders were even starting to express that their organizations were 
moving away from REDD+ even if they were still interested in achieving the outcomes. 




disassociated their forest projects with REDD+ because of this sentiment. One 
respondent operating within the Indonesian government directly stated that they were not 
interested in being involved in REDD+,  “REDD now is forestry, but then the Ministry of 
Forestry says we don't want REDD. Because REDD is now being managed by [other 
agencies]. For a long time I've always been saying that we still have to have REDD. But, 
they don't want to use the term REDD. So they always say, 'We don't want REDD'.”-
Respondent ID 10393. Other stakeholders had doubt that REDD+ would be successful 
because of other similar programs that had taken place, and not achieved what they set 
out to do. “We were in this situation where on the ground, where the Bupati [district 
head] is basically saying, 'I like your approach, but I don't want to get involved in carbon 
trading, I don't want to focus on carbon trading, I want to focus on sustainable forest 
management and community benefits, etc. If you can help develop a program for that 
without getting bogged down in carbon trading, that's good'. The reason being that he 
had been involved, he had sort of been suckered into thinking about the CDM [clean 
development mechanism] and that the CDM was going to deliver a lot of benefits 
because there's a big EU fund for it. And it basically never materialized”—Respondent 
ID 10374.  
Some stakeholders felt that although there was much attention given to REDD+ at 
the national level, this was not the case on the ground, “There's projects...but really if you 
look at what's happening on the ground, it's not that much. Except for a few projects...but 
some of them are also making more noise than anything.  There's not really that much 
action, and especially involving local governments.” -- Respondent ID 10367. And 




stakeholders felt that all of the attention to REDD+ at the National and provincial levels, 
combined with a lack of action at the project level was part of what caused stakeholder 
fatigue, “I get a lot of impressions from people and it seems like Central Kalimantan has 
had so much focus on it that there is a bit of, a kind of REDD fatigue there, I think, and 
frustration with all the things that are happening.” — Respondent ID 10370.  
4.4.4.1 Lack of buy in  
 While related to stakeholder fatigue, comments about lack of buy-in were more 
about how certain stakeholders do not believe that REDD+ will work, or benefit them, 
and are thus disinterested in supporting projects and other efforts. Analysis of the 
political context of Indonesia has demonstrated that REDD+ lacks support at national and 
local government levels as well as among the public (Luttrell et al. 2014). Respondents 
expressed frustration at the lack of buy-in by government agencies at both the national 
and local levels, but also many other stakeholders expressed a lack of buy-in. The topic 
of buy-in was discussed by respondents in these two different capacities – the first being 
their own lack of buy-in, and the second being their perception of a lack of buy-in from 
other stakeholder groups. While these two aspects of buy-in were often mentioned 
separately, there is a relationship between the two. Often informants would explain their 
own doubts about REDD+ as being influenced by seeing a lack of buy-in from other 
stakeholder groups.  This is characterized in the following quote, by a stakeholder, 
working at both the national and project levels,“…[The Government of Indonesia is] very 
defensive about this deforestation issue, particularly because of palm oil…because it’s 
their number one export, and it’s the cause of all this deforestation. On the one hand, 




support this and they support that. And then over here, it’s one concession after another 
for conversion to oil, and then they don’t do anything about all the small-scale 
conversion….”.—Respondent ID 10419. Members of forest communities, extensively 
involved in some REDD+ projects also expressed doubts about the ultimate utility of 
REDD+, “All I think we can really hope for is ownership over our forest. These projects 
are only helping us a little.” – Respondent ID 10416 
 Frequently, comments about buy-in and concerns about how much buy-in other 
stakeholder groups had were directed towards the Indonesian Government at both 
national and local scales. The concern about a lack of buy-in was voiced most frequently 
regarding local governments, as one stakeholder put it rather bluntly, “…the buy-in from 
the government [in that district] is still pretty weak.”—Respondent ID 10407. There is 
some evidence to support these sentiments in the literature reporting a lack of 
enforcement and support experienced by national parks and some REDD+ projects at the 
local level (Yuliani et al. 2010; WWF 2013). A variety of stakeholders felt that the plans 
for REDD+ in Indonesia had not included ways to create buy-in or incentives for local 
governments, and which ultimately impacted how much many local governments 
supported REDD+ projects.  One national-level government official explained it like this, 
”There is no reason for these subnational governments to buy in, there is no buy-in at 
all.  Why should they be interested in REDD? What is it doing for them?  Bupati [district 
heads] are only around for 5 years, they want some kind of reward that'll happen when 




Some stakeholders that were involved in running REDD+ projects were not even 
certain that their own projects would be successful. Such doubt has the potential to 
undermine the longevity and commitment to achieving REDD+ outcomes. As one 
stakeholder put it, “ Not that there's any success stories. You know, I think the stuff we're 
doing [at our REDD+ project], you know we really don't have it figured out there.”—
Respondent ID 10380. Others felt that all of the problems compounded the fact that many 
stakeholders failed to see, or believe, how REDD+ could benefit them, “There are so 
many issues that are going on here…we have to find what the source of the issues is first. 
Because if you talk about the challenges of REDD, well, I can say that maybe resistance 
from the general governments or resistance from perhaps the NGOs, or perhaps the 
indigenous people, the tribes. So those are the people that we have to convince that ‘This 
is for you.” –Respondent ID 10385. Getting support and buy-in for REDD+ at all scales 
will be necessary if REDD+ is to have any hope for success in the long run.    
5. Conclusions 
 REDD+ is undergoing a crisis of confidence in Indonesia. Few stakeholders at 
local, regional, national and international levels have much faith that REDD+ will be 
successfully realized in Indonesia in the near future. Many respondents working directly 
on REDD+ felt there was a serious lack of pathways for moving forward and project 
implementation, something which likely added to delays in REDD+ development and 
may have exacerbated feelings of doubt. Clashing perspectives and cultural barriers were 




 At all levels, there are frustrations with corruption, governance, land tenure, slow 
progress and bureaucracy. Furthermore, this research shows a wide-spread loss of faith in 
the central mission of REDD+. Most stakeholders no longer believe that the REDD+ 
mechanism can compete with alternative land uses and that REDD+ can be a successful 
mechanism using carbon markets to reduce emissions from deforestation and 
degradation. While some actors are turning their backs on the REDD+ mechanism all 
together, many actors are content to use REDD+, and the recognition and funds it makes 
available, to achieve other long-term goals such as biodiversity conservation and 
community rights – intended to be co-benefits, not the objectives of REDD as it is 
envisioned at an international level.  
While much of the sentiment towards REDD+ expressed by stakeholders is 
negative, there were also positive aspects and opportunities for improvement that were 
expressed by respondents. While many stakeholders have doubts about the future of 
REDD+, many at least acknowledge that some good has come about as a result of 
REDD+ activities on the national level, as well as projects on the ground. Despite the 
evidence that REDD+ has not yet achieved the ambitious goals of reducing Indonesia’s 
deforestation rate (WRI GFW 2016), some actions towards forest governance reform 
have resulted from the introduction of REDD+ and the international attention it has 
drawn to Indonesia’s forests. These actions include the presidential moratorium on new 
licenses (Busch et al. 2015), discourse regarding Indonesia’s sometimes problematic 
forest classifications (Enrici and Hubacek 2016), as well as continued international 
support for REDD+ efforts (Government of Norway, Government of the United 




One stakeholder framed the positive side of REDD+ as increased interaction 
among the Indonesian government and other stakeholder groups, “But in terms of the 
REDD process itself…I think a lot of good things [are] happening when they engage 
various stakeholders. And this REDD process, I think it’s very special also to Indonesia 
because I think the REDD+ also gives the momentum for [the] Indonesian government to 
start recognizing the contribution from other stakeholders, not only from the government. 
For example, a good example is that now they have been actively involving the civil 
society, involving the private sectors, in, not only in the events, but also in the process of 
developing like strategies and other initiatives like OneMap, the multi-door approach, 
and things like that. So I think that’s quite positive. And also coordination among 
ministries is also as important. And I think that never happened before, I mean, not as 
significant as now, yeah? Because now with the REDD-plus momentum, we realize that 
without coordination, good coordination, among stakeholders, among ministries, or it 
will never happen.”—Respondent ID 10396. Another similar perspective is that REDD+, 
although maybe not exactly being the program that the United Nations designed it to be, 
is a catalyst which will drive change and help encourage policy reform and better forest 
management, “ I really like the perspective, the idea that REDD is going to drive 
change.” – Respondent ID 10499.  Other stakeholders felt that by entering into projects 
for the long term, there was a possibility for positive change.  As has been mentioned by 
many of the stakeholders interviewed for this study, working in the Indonesian context 
requires perseverance and understanding. One stakeholder put it like this, “ It’s almost a 
kind of a test of stamina here. A lot of donors have decided to withdraw because they’ve 




like we have a good relationship because we’ve been around the longest.”—Respondent 
ID 10376. If REDD+ is to succeed it will be important for NGOs and stakeholders to 
recognize both positive outcomes as well as shortcomings, and for stakeholders to remain 
committed and work towards their goals in REDD+, even in the face of challenges. 





Chapter 6: Conclusion 
It is important to note the broader global context  and revisit the history of 
REDD+ in order to put the results of this research, and forest carbon in perspective with 
global environmental governance and forest degradation. As the realities of climate 
change became more widely recognized and discussed in the scientific and public 
discourse, the UNFCCC was established at the Rio Earth Summit in 1992. The Kyoto 
Protocol in 1997 saw many industrialized countries to commit to greenhouse gas 
reductions.  Under the protocol, a carbon market was established in which these 
industrialized countries could purchase emissions reductions from less developed 
countries, in order to continue their own carbon emitting activities (Bumpus and 
Liverman 2010). Despite estimates of the contributions of deforestation to anthropogenic 
carbon emissions, around 25% during the 1990s (Houghton 2005), emissions reductions 
were not included as part of the initial carbon market mechanism under the Kyoto 
Protocol, though reforestation was included in the Clean Development Mechanism, and 
later in 2007 proposals were made to include REDD in the international climate regime at 
the thirteenth session of the Conference of Parties to the UNFCCC (COP-13) (Neeff and 
Ascui 2009). This inclusion of REDD+ was proposed as a way to address deforestation in 
developing countries as a major contributor of anthropogenic green house gases, and to 
help provide financial and policy support for such efforts. In subsequent years REDD+ 
has been included in UNFCCC considerations.  
REDD+ is a payment for ecosystem service. The valuation of ecosystem services, 
or payment for ecosystem services (PES), is a mechanism by which financial 




that they provide to humanity. REDD+ has been described as the largest PES initiative to 
date (Bond 2009). PES schemes have gained popularity in recent years but have received 
some criticism regarding the uneven cost and benefit distribution among ecosystem 
managers and those benefiting from ecosystems (Hubacek et al. 2009) as well as for 
shifting the focus away from industries that are polluting (Mauerhofer, Hubacek, and 
Coleby 2013) something which is true for the REDD+ program design. However, like 
most PES schemes, the neoliberal roots of REDD+ can be seen through the way the 
program seeks  to commodify forests by incorporating them into markets, and moreover 
does so on a global scale. The proposed mechanisms, such as REDD+, for reducing 
global anthropogenic carbon emissions have also been described by many (McElwee 
2012; McAfee and Shapiro 2010; Lohmann 2009) as a neoliberal environmental 
governance scheme for wealthy core countries to continue to develop and grow 
economically while maintaining high levels of carbon emissions and pay other countries 
to reduce their emissions. Another way to describe it is as someone who is trying to lose 
weight by paying someone else to go on a diet (Checker 2009). Other concerns include 
the over-emphasis that REDD+ and other aspects of the international climate regime rely 
too heavily on market mechanisms; over-emphasize carbon, and undervalue other 
components of forest conservation such as biodiversity (despite the inclusion of co-
benefits in many REDD+ plans); and the vulnerable populations at the local level are 
being marginalized rather than benefiting (Paladino and Fiske 2016). 
Despite these concerns, high global rates of deforestation (Hansen et al. 2013), 
habitat loss (Hoekstra et al. 2005; Ferraro 2001), and species extinction (Ceballos et al. 




solutions has meant that such economic valuation of ecosystem services in order to 
provide an incentive to protect natural resources, rather than harvest them, has gained 
tremendous attention and popularity in recent decades (Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010) 
The commodification of ecosystem services and marketization of the natural world offer 
hope to some for conservation efforts, but are cautioned to have potential negative 
impacts on stakeholders, ecosystems (Milder, Scherr, and Bracer 2010) and regional & 
national economies (Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013a; Kronenberg and Hubacek 2013b). 
Political ecology investigations of environmental management scenarios that bear 
similarities to REDD+ have demonstrated that the global discourse is disconnected from 
local level environmental dynamics and resource users  (Agrawal and Ostrom 2001). In 
discourses surrounding large scale environmental management on issues of deforestation, 
international and national scale institutions are separate and distant from local level 
resource users and environmental dynamics (Adger et al. 2001). On the other hand, in 
some cases implementation processes for REDD+ can proceed in spite of multiple and 
separate discourses that do not converge (van der Hoff et al. 2015). There is even the 
potential for replacing the very value systems that have protected these forests in the past 
(Gómez-Baggethun et al. 2010). And in some instances of PES, larger entities, such as 
private corporations, have their goals met while indigenous communities are further 
marginalized (Grandia 2007; Igoe and Brockington 2007) and there is some evidence that 
this is also the case in carbon offset schemes (Yocum 2016; Checker 2009). Despite these 
and other legitimate concerns, PES for tropical forests, and REDD+ in particular, 
continue to develop at a rapid pace because of the lack of alternative solutions to 




world from the global economy.  
There are many aspects of REDD+ that fit in with what some call the 
neoliberalization of nature or neoliberal conservation.  Though the exact nature of 
neoliberalism is debated there are some aspects that are prevalent in the literature. 
Heynen and Robbins discuss privatization – when natural resources change from public, 
commons, or state authority to private firms and individuals; enclosure – or the 
segregation of common resources and thus exclusion of communities to which they are 
linked; and commodification – the reduction of priceless ecosystems services and natural 
resources into economic commodities (Heynen and Robbins 2005 p.6).  Reregulation, or 
the deconstruction of current laws and policies and creation of new regulations, is another 
common theme (Guthman 2007; Castree 2008b). All of these phenomena can be 
identified in aspects of REDD implementation –forests are becoming privatized, they are 
being given new boundaries and territories in some areas with possible exclusion of 
indigenous communities, and they are being commodified and reregulated.  However, 
neoliberalization and its outcomes are not necessarily summarily negative; it is possible 
for there to be beneficial “environmental fixes” and outcomes from such 
activities(Castree 2008b; Castree 2008a). In theory, neoliberal conservation efforts 
promise much – bringing new resources to conservation, community involvement, simple 
solutions to complex problems, and even development in concert with conservation (Igoe 
and Brockington 2007; Grandia 2007), all of which can be considered anticipated 
elements of REDD+. Yet, unfortunately these promises are not always met when such 




In Indonesia the implementation of these programs have been complicated and 
there is no clear answer on how they are, or are not, benefiting forests, biodiversity, or 
communities.  The deforestation rate in Indonesia has continued to accelerate since 
REDD+ introduction (Margono et al. 2014; (WRI GFW) World Resources Institute 
Global Forest Watch 2016). Forest community involvement has remained complicated in 
many instances of REDD+ activities in Indonesia, as well as in the overall Indonesian 
context (De Royer et al. 2015). Furthermore, it has become apparent that the carbon 
market and REDD+ initiatives cannot compete with the finances of economic activities 
associated with deforestation (Butler, Koh, and Ghazoul 2009). Based on the research 
presented in this dissertation, it seems that while the criticisms of neoliberal conservation 
hold true -- while part of the problem is placing a price tag on forests (an invaluable part 
of earth’s ecosystem), the price we have placed on them is far too low, and considerations 
for true inclusion of co-benefits remain undeveloped. However, at the moment there is no 
“Plan B” for how to approach the urgent problem of deforestation in tropical countries, 
and as of yet there is no other hope for forests –REDD+ efforts offer the most promising 
answer for attempting to slow down deforestation until an alternative and viable solution 
is proposed.  
Much discussion surrounding the REDD program has been critical of the 
commodification of forest resources, weary of the effects these programs on local forest 
communities and concerned about the dynamics of the relationships among stakeholder 
groups (Büscher, Dressler, and Fletcher 2014; Paladino and Fiske 2016; Peet, Robbins, 
and Watts 2010). While some herald the commodification of the ecosystem services of 




of nature will also further marginalize indigenous local communities and have other 
unanticipated negative impacts (Brockington and Duffy 2010). While it is important to 
remember that both the United Nations and Indonesia have recognized the importance of 
stakeholder involvement in the process (REDD National Policy 2012) there are still 
concerns that certain stakeholder groups, particularly local forest communities, are, and 
will continue to be, marginalized (Fiske and Paladino 2016). The United Nations 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples’ (UN DRIP) guidelines require the 
involvement of indigenous people in the synthesis of policies and plans for climate 
change mitigation (UN-REDD Programme Indonesia and Indonesia Ministry of Forestry 
2011). However, in spite of similar assurances in other conservation initiatives, 
indigenous groups have been marginalized (Grandia 2007; Igoe and Brockington 2007). 
There are still many well-founded concerns about the long-term ramifications of REDD+ 
and how stakeholder groups, particularly forest communities, are being affected and 
whether or not there will truly be a benefit to forest ecosystems. The analysis of REDD+ 
implementation in Indonesia provided here offers some initial perspective on some of the 
challenges and opportunities that are playing out with the program’s development. The 
results offer the opportunity to inform the ongoing development of REDD+ in Indonesia 
as well as REDD implementation in the dozens of other countries in which it is being 
undertaken. 
The way that REDD+ appears in the international & national discourses and 
literature is very different from how it looks when talking to people who are deeply 
involved and see it happening on the ground. Comparing the regulatory and governance 




implementation reveals very different implications for the program. The large sums of 
money that are being pledged for support of REDD+ indicates that there must still be 
some hope for REDD+ (Barrett and Goldstein 2016; Government of Norway and 
Government of Indonesia 2010). Yet the research presented in this dissertation 
demonstrates a crisis of confidence in REDD+ that is endemic to stakeholders throughout 
Indonesia, and likely elsewhere as well.   
During the time I was conducting this research, I encountered many respondents, 
extensively involved in REDD+, that would question my motivation for studying the 
program, or even outright suggest that I change my dissertation topic to something else.  
These sentiments reflect the fact that many of those working on REDD+ view the future 
of the program as tenuous, at best. The Indonesian context can be incredibly challenging 
and chaotic, something which is widely acknowledged among those working in the 
country. While it can be difficult to address this directly in academic literature, it is 
necessary for understanding the real challenges for programs like REDD+ and successful 
forest governance. Conducting ethnographic research with stakeholders of REDD+ from 
all scales and a multitude of stakeholder groups has allowed me to do so here.  Certainly 
REDD+ globally faces many challenges with funding, policy, and implementation 
logistics and the example of Indonesia, because of its extent of tropical forest and 
challenging governance context, is particularly pertinent. The results of this dissertation 
identify the specific areas for concern, which could be viewed as focal points for policy 
recommendations.  
 Chapter 2 identifies the specific components of the Indonesian context that have 




after the initial introduction of REDD+.  Complicated and weak governance are pervasive 
in the Indonesian context, particularly so for forestry (HRW 2013).  Overlapping 
authority between the central government and local governments makes creating and 
enforcing effective regulations a major challenge (Sahide et al. 2016). Even the basic 
forest classification system has contradictions that have made the situation difficult to 
navigate.  Corruption has been and remains rampant throughout Indonesia and its forestry 
sector (Dermawan et al. 2011; Butt 2011), adding to the difficulties presented by other 
aspects of the REDD+ context, such as lack of funding and buy-in.  The Indonesian 
Government’s REDD+ actions to date, particularly the moratorium, seem to indicate 
support of the program but do little to actually affect change.   
 Chapter 3 identifies some of the major components needed for evaluating 
Indonesian REDD+ projects and how they are achieving their goals.  The importance of 
financial viability, community involvement, enforcement of project boundaries, and 
independent monitoring are each in turn described in relation to the Indonesian context.  
Part of the reason that financial viability is so important to stress is because of the 
disconnect between a perception of abundant funding, including the promised funding 
from Norway and other donors, and the lack of actual funding opportunities for projects.  
Community involvement has been agreed upon as an essential component of REDD+, 
though how to effectively engage communities remains uncertain in many situations 
(Bayrak and Marafa 2016).  Enforcement of project boundaries in Indonesia is 
particularly difficult as weak governance and corruption prevent stakeholders from 
having dominion over their project areas.  Monitoring is necessary to ensure that projects 




ground.  Evaluating these components in light of the three case study sites helps to 
provide understanding on how REDD+ might or might not be achieving goals for carbon 
sequestration and biodiversity preservation.  In the case of the three study sites, only 
Rimba Raya has produced verified results. 
 Chapter 4 uses the results of the overall ethnographic data collection to present a 
picture of stakeholders’ views of REDD+ throughout Indonesia.  Doubt about REDD+ 
and stakeholder fatigue are characteristic of the Indonesian forestry context. The 
pervasiveness of this lack of confidence has the potential to undermine the entire REDD+ 
program, if not addressed. Informants also reported a lack of pathways for 
implementation particularly because of corruption and how it affects governance 
capacity, complicated and confusing regulations, the lack of funding, and bureaucratic 
difficulties associated with obtaining licenses for ERCs.  The difference in perspectives 
about REDD+ among stakeholders means that the program remains nebulous. Cultural 
differences among different stakeholder groups is a major factor in undermining 
stakeholder confidence in REDD+ in Indonesia.  
 What emerges from these chapters is a description of a massive effort towards 
reduction of deforestation and forest degradation that is struggling to gain traction. 
Because REDD+ cannot yet compete financially with other types of land uses (Butler, 
Koh, and Ghazoul 2009), it is at an inherent disadvantage. This disadvantage is likely 
exacerbated by corruption, considering how alternate land use interests can leverage a 
corrupt system to gain support from authorities. Despite these and the other challenges 
discussed here for REDD+, a recent study (Busch and Engelmann 2015) indicates that if 




conservation do have a great potential for preventing emissions from deforestation and 
forest degradation. Furthermore, it is possible that some of the regulatory changes made 
by Indonesia’s government will have positive impacts in the future – for example, while 
the moratorium on new forest licenses may not have immediately contributed to reduced 
deforestation rates, there is potential for it to have some positive impact (Busch et al. 
2015).  Thus, despite the challenges for REDD+, the program could facilitate positive 
change in the future. Whether or not it will be able to do so in Indonesia will depend on 
many of the factors discussed in these chapters.  
 The factors that will determine REDD+’s ability to have positive outcomes for 
forest cover include: governance (such as policy, government support, corruption, & 
tenure clarity); funding opportunities; collaboration with forest communities; utilization 
of available monitoring technology; creating logistical and bureaucratic pathways for 
implementation; stakeholder belief and buy-in; and bridging the gap between perceptions 
at high and lower scales of implementation. Governance reform in Indonesia is not likely 
to happen quickly, for reasons discussed elsewhere in this dissertation. However, it will 
be necessary for the Indonesian government to truly support the REDD+ effort, in reality 
as well as in rhetoric.  This support from the government may help to increase the 
number of ERC licenses issued, and improve bureaucratic pathways for implementation. 
Unfortunately, recent events surrounding anti-corruption efforts (Vernaz 2015; Butt 
2011) indicate that corruption is not likely to decline any time soon. Funding 
opportunities may increase as more countries commit to supporting REDD+, and if 
carbon markets are able to improve in coming years.  Establishing baselines (Pelletier and 




2015) will also increase accountability, as the data about forest cover gain and loss 
becomes widely available. Collaboration with forest communities will be essential as the 
program progresses, and there may be lessons to learn in this regard from projects such as 
Kapuas Hulu and Rimba Raya. Obtaining buy-in from communities and local 
governments will also be crucial to project success, and so considerations for how to do 
so must be included with project planning. Getting stakeholders to believe in REDD+ and 
continue to invest effort over time will be extremely difficult. The only way for this to 
happen may be for REDD+ itself to begin to demonstrate tangible improvements to forest 
cover in Indonesia.    
 Production forests in Indonesia are one of the places where forests are most 
vulnerable (Buergin 2016), making ERCs one of the areas where REDD+ could have the 
biggest impact. However, as demonstrated by the rejection of REDD+ by Harapan 
Rainforest, the two are not inherently linked. On the other hand, the potential for profit 
and attention brought about by REDD+ has attracted the involvement of Infinite Earth 
and the organizers of Rimba Makmur (another recently approved ERC for a large scale 
REDD+ project in Central Kalimantan) and ultimately resulted in conservation activities 
in what could otherwise have been converted palm oil fields. While projects like Kapuas 
Hulu may have been started without the REDD+ label, they have at least gained 
recognition because of their use of the REDD+ label. The challenges presented in this 
research indicate that much work and effort are needed to make REDD+ work. Below are 























































































5.2 Future Research 
While this research presents a description of REDD+ from the viewpoint of 
stakeholders working on the program from international to the local scale, there is more 
work that could be done to illuminate the areas for creating successful REDD+ outcomes.  
Stakeholder perceptions and Indonesia’s deforestation rate (WRI GFW 2016) indicate 
that the future of REDD+ is in doubt. In coming years it will be essential to inform policy 
decisions, REDD+ guidelines, and inform those involved in REDD+.  
While Chapter 2 points out the specific policy and forest governance components that 
may be hindering REDD+ progress, there is not yet an obvious solution as to how this 
can be addressed.  As was discussed in Chapter 4, the Indonesian context makes it 
particularly challenging to address governance issues.  Future studies focused on the 
governance sector and how to rectify weak and complicated governance, with respect to 
the cultural complexities discussed in Chapter 4, could be particularly useful for moving 




Chapter 3 addresses the important factors of REDD+ projects that go into project 
development. As more projects are implemented on the ground, more case studies could 
help contribute to this topic, particularly in the realm of community involvement and 
effective governance. More data from successful REDD+ initiatives, that have been 
independently verified, such as Rimba Raya, could help other projects that are still under 
development.  
Chapter 4 provides a description of the challenges for REDD+ from the perspective 
of stakeholders, but more research on stakeholder views could help identify pathways 
forward. One of the major challenges are cultural barriers, lack of confidence in REDD+ 
and insufficient buy-in. Further research on how to overcome cultural barriers, get buy-
in, increase stakeholder confidence in REDD+ could be crucial to improving the 












Sample of interview guideline from data collection 
 
Questions included the following specific questions, and more nuanced questions based 
on each informant’s responses:  
 
Please describe your knowledge of REDD+ and the extent of your involvement of 
REDD+. 
 
Can you describe any collaborations you have had with other individuals or groups 
towards the REDD+ effort?   
 
Can you tell me more about your current perspective on REDD+ implementation in 
Indonesia? [Follow up: How has that perspective changed in the past year or two?] 
 
What do you think REDD+ will look like in 5 years? 
 
What are your hopes for the future of this project?   
 
What concerns do you have in relation to this effort?   
 
How has REDD+ impacted you [How has REDD+ impacted your community]? How has 
REDD+ impacted others you know?  
 
What aspects of this experience have been positive? What aspects of this experience have 
been difficult or negative?  	
 
What do you perceive as being the major roadblocks to forest protection and REDD 
implementation in Indonesia? 
 
Is there anything else that I didn't bring up that you feel is worth discussing? 
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